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CIVIL CYBERCONFLICT: MICROSOFT, 
CYBERCRIME, AND BOTNETS 
Janine S. Hiller† 
Cyber “warfare” and hackback by private companies is a hot 
discussion topic for its potential to fight cybercrime and promote 
cybersecurity. In the shadow of this provocative discussion, Microsoft 
has led a concerted, sustained fight against cybercriminals by using 
traditional legal theories and court actions to dismantle criminal 
networks known as botnets. This article brings focus to the role of the 
private sector in cybersecurity in light of the aggressive civil actions 
by Microsoft to address a thorny and seemingly intractable global 
problem. A botnet is a network of computers infected with unauthorized 
code that is controlled from a distance by malicious actors. The extent 
of botnet activity is staggering, and botnets have been called the plague 
of the Internet. The general public is more commonly aware of the 
damaging results of botnet activity rather than its operation, intrusion, 
or infection capabilities. Botnet activity may result in a website being 
unavailable due to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, identity theft can 
occur because the botnet collects passwords from individual users, and 
bank accounts may be emptied related to botnet activity. Spam, fraud, 
spyware, and data breaches are all the result of botnet activity. 
Technical remedies for stopping botnet attacks and damages are 
ongoing, but technical solutions alone are inadequate. Law 
enforcement is active in tracking down criminal activities of botnets, 
yet the number and sophistication of the attackers overwhelm it. In a 
new development, multiple civil lawsuits by Microsoft have created the 
legal precedent for suing botnet operators and using existing law to 
dismantle botnets and decrease their global reach. This article reviews 
the threats created by botnets and describes the evolution of legal and 
technical strategies to address botnet proliferation. The distinctive 
aspects of each of the cases brought by Microsoft are described and 
analyzed and the complex questions surrounding a botnet takedown 
 
 † Janine S. Hiller is a Professor of Business Law, and the Richard E. Sorensen Professor 
in Finance, at Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Va. (jhiller@vt.edu).   
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are identified. Discussion of the details of the lawsuits are important, 
because over a relatively short period of time, government and private 
sector roles have evolved considerably in the search for a methodology 
to deal effectively with botnets. Theoretical and international questions 
surrounding the sustainability and policy ramifications of private 
sector leadership in cybersecurity are examined, and questions for 
future research are identified. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Headlines of cyberattacks, data breaches, identity theft, spam, and 
social engineering draw public attention and outrage. Cyber “warfare” 
and hackback by private companies is a hot discussion topic for its 
potential to fight cybercrime and promote cybersecurity.1 In the 
shadow of this provocative discussion, Microsoft has led a concerted, 
sustained fight against cybercriminals by using traditional legal 
theories and court actions to dismantle criminal networks known as 
botnets. This article brings focus to the role of the private sector in 
cybersecurity in light of the aggressive civil actions by Microsoft to 
address a thorny and seemingly intractable global problem.  
The method for delivering cyberattacks damages is commonly by 
means of large numbers of “zombie” computers infected with malware. 
Criminals and hacktivists surreptitiously and without authorization 
install software on individual computers, allowing them to control and 
use the multitude of computers to accomplish illicit purposes. The 
group of computers controlled can number into the hundreds of 
thousands, and even millions. With these large numbers, a criminal is 
able to wield increased power and extend his reach around the globe. 
The group of connected, controlled computers just described is called 
a botnet. Botnets are the “plague of the Internet.”2 
Effective disarmament of growing numbers of global botnets is a 
difficult challenge; while technical solutions are developed to disrupt 
and disable them, the malicious controller responds with new tactics 
and increasingly sophisticated software. At the same time, the 
increasingly significant harm caused by these networks of “hijacked” 
computers, fueling cybercrime across the globe, makes it exponentially 
more important to control their spread. In addition, because botnets 
operate across national boundaries, disabling them can involve national 
and international legal and policy questions. As countries try to protect 
their citizens from malware that knows no physical boundaries, it is 
possible that the failure to control the growth and harmful effects of 
botnets could have such far-reaching effect as to create barriers within 
 
 1. See Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State 
Actors as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 275 (2013) (discussing the debate and theory of hackback). For a cyberwar 
perspective discussing the relationship between military and private actors in cyberspace, and 
potential limitations, see Alan Butler, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third 
Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1203 (2013). 
 2. A phrase used in many of the Microsoft civil suit court documents. 
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the fundamental Internet infrastructure and walled segments for 
protection.3 However, preventing the spread of illegal botnet activity is 
not only a public safety issue for law enforcement; private parties and 
businesses have been active in the remediation of malicious software.  
Thus, the questions surrounding a botnet takedown are complex. 
Over a relatively short period, government and private sector roles have 
evolved considerably in the search for a methodology to deal 
effectively with botnets. In order to understand the evolution, this 
article first provides a brief technical description of botnet operations 
and an explanation of why employing purely technical means have 
proven insufficient to handle the threat. Earlier voluntary efforts of 
loosely networked entities are explained and their limitations 
examined. Many private entities deserve recognition and credit for their 
fight against botnets. The limited focus of this article, however, is 
Microsoft’s lead role in pursuing private civil action to thwart and 
disable botnets. The private, civil action legal approach to dismantling 
botnets is chronicled, highlighting the evolution of increasingly 
aggressive tactics and the involvement of law enforcement. A record 
of Microsoft’s legal strategies is important to memorialize the 
precedent that was set by their aggressive legal actions to fight these 
cyberthreats, as this model could be adopted by other businesses. Wider 
adoption of Microsoft’s legal approach to dismantle botnets needs 
further study. The article proposes four lenses for this future work: 
“crimtort,” governance, strategic management, and international 
perspectives. At present, Microsoft, its partners, law enforcement, and 
international stakeholders express the willingness to collaborate; 
private sector leadership may prove to be the necessary ingredient for 
a sustained and successful fight against technically advanced and 
globally dispersed cybercrime. 
I. BOTNETS AND TAKEDOWN APPROACHES 
A basic understanding of how botnets are structured and 
controlled is necessary to appreciate why technical means alone are 
insufficient to destroy them. The difficulty of using technical means to 
defeat botnets is equaled by the challenges of assembling the 
appropriate persons or entities to disrupt them. While it may be counter 
intuitive law enforcement did not take the early lead in disrupting 
criminal botnets. Instead, a voluntary coalition of various private 
 
 3. See Andrea Renda, Cybersecurity and Internet Governance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (May 3, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-internet-governance 
/p30621. 
08_ARTICLE_HILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2015  1:51 PM 
2015] CIVIL CYBER CONFLICT 167 
parties and an international corporation mounted a collaborative effort 
that produced positive results. When law enforcement in the United 
States did take aggressive action to remediate botnet activity, some 
criticism about their tactics emerged.4 A brief technical background of 
botnets and a review of the collaborative and law enforcement efforts 
to rid the Internet of these threats provide an important backdrop to 
understanding Microsoft’s legal tactics to reach similar results by 
different means. 
A. Definitions and Threats 
A bot is defined as a software “program [installed on a computer] 
that performs user centric tasks automatically without any interactions 
from a user.”5 Once a computer is infected with the controlling software 
(malware), it is commonly called a “bot.” When a program is installed 
on a computer in a manner that joins similar computers into a network 
with the same program, then a botnet is created. In the beginning, 
networks of computers controlled by a centralized server were designed 
to automatically execute certain repetitive tasks; in other words, they 
were performing beneficial functions.6 Although botnets do not have to 
be malicious, in today’s environment they are almost always referred 
to as such.  
An essential aspect of a botnet is that another party, at a distance, 
controls the network of infected computers. Interestingly, it is surmised 
that the systematic spread of bots was advanced by the music-sharing 
service Napster, which used a central server in order to facilitate music 
sharing.7 Today, the entity or person in control of a botnet is known as 
a “botherder,” or “botmaster.”8 The server(s), or computer(s), that 
 
 4. See Kim Zetter, With Court Order, FBI Hijacks ‘Coreflood’ Botnet, Sends Kill Signal, 
WIRED (Apr. 13, 2011, 6:17 P.M.), http://www.wired.com/2011/04/coreflood/ (quoting critical 
comments from Chris Palmer at the Electronic Frontier Foundation; about the possibility for 
unintended consequences). 
 5. JULIAN B. GRIZZARD ET AL., PEER-TO-PEER BOTNETS: OVERVIEW AND CASE STUDY 2 
(2007), available at https://www.usenix.org/conference/hotbots-07/peer-peer-botnets-overview 
-and-case-study.  
 6. See id. at 1.  
 7. Id. at 2.  
 8. See LUIS VIHUL ET AL., NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF 
EXCELLENCE & EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY AGENCY, LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTERING BOTNETS 4 (2012) (comparing the laws of Estonia and Germany 
as applied to botnet remediation efforts). 
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functions as a central control point of control for the bots is known as 
a “command and control” (C&C) server.9  
In comparison to the C&C centralized architecture described 
above, botnets can employ a decentralized control system without a 
central control point. These distributed botnets use a peer-to-peer (P2P) 
communication system. Instead of querying the control server(s) for 
updates and instructions, P2P botnets are designed so that individual 
computers share and spread commands, thereby avoiding the 
vulnerability of a central C&C server. P2P botnets have become 
increasingly more complex and resilient to takedown, and the number 
of P2P botnets have increased five-fold over the last year.10  
In the vast majority of cases, an unauthorized, malicious 
software/program is installed surreptitiously with the intent to use the 
bot in a botnet for a criminal and harmful purpose. Yet it is not always 
so. Groups of like-minded individuals can voluntarily allow their 
computers to be infected with a bot in order to accomplish a common 
purpose. The hactivist group Anonymous uses this strategy, making it 
as easy as checking a box to sign up to participate in a botnet.11 As a 
result, individuals may become part of a greater online protest 
movement by voluntarily joining a botnet; for example, the botnet may 
be used to launch an attack on a website in order to make a political 
statement.12  
Botnets have become a commodity. A person does not need to be 
technically advanced to rent a botnet by the hour or to buy one outright. 
In 2012, one could rent a botnet for $2 an hour, or could purchase it for 
$700.13 More sophisticated botnets were recently “sold as a service” for 
 
 9. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PROACTIVE POLICY MEASURES BY 
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AGAINST BOTNETS 8 (2012); see also Yacin Nadji et al., 
Beheading Hydras: Performing Effective Botnet Takedowns, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 ACM 
CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMMC’NS SEC. 121 (2013). 
 10. Michael Mimoso, Number of Peer-to-Peer Botnets Grows 5X, THREATPOST BLOG 
(June 5, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://threatpost.com/number-of-peer-to-peer-botnets-grows-5x.  
 11. See Ryan Singel, Joining Pro-Wikileaks Attacks is as Easy as Clicking a Button, WIRED 
(Dec. 10, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/web20-attack-anonymous/. 
 12  See NART VILLENEUVE, KOOBFACE: INSIDE A CRIMEWARE NETWORK 3 (2010), 
available at http://www.infowar-monitor.net/reports/iwm-koobface.pdf (“It [a botnet] can be used 
to direct computers to click on fake advertisements for Viagra or marshal them together to attack 
a meddlesome human rights website, as it is with increasing frequency from Iran and Kazakhstan 
to Burma and Vietnam.”). 
 13. Ian Steadman, The Russian Underground has Democratized Cybercrime, WIRED (Nov. 
2, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-11/02/russian-cybercrime.   
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$60,000 to $120,000 per year.14 The cost of purchasing a botnet pales 
in comparison to the estimated potential income generated, between ten 
thousand and ten million dollars per month.15 
The Trend Micro Global Botnet Threat Activity Map, capturing 
real-time activity, reported 9,451 C&C active servers, and 8,283,061 
botnet connections, at the time this article was written.16 It is difficult 
to measure the extent of botnet infections worldwide, or to estimate the 
cumulative damage to computer owners and ultimate victims. 
However, botnets provide a major transportation mode for cybercrime, 
and yearly estimates of cybercrime damages vary from between $110 
billion to $1 trillion per year.17 
It is only too obvious that botnets are a scourge of the Internet, 
despite concerted actions to thwart their spread. Companies adopt 
security defenses, individuals attempt to update security software, 
security firms and researchers work continuously to learn about and 
dismantle botnet threats. One of the first collaborative, large-scale, 
efforts took place to thwart the worm known as Conficker, which was 
poised to become a huge international botnet.18 The takedown, 
described in the following section, was accomplished primarily by 
private entities with international cooperation, including ICANN and 
associated entity participation, but it lacked significant government 
involvement.19  
 
 14. See ALAN NEVILLE & ROSS GIBB, ZEROACCESS INDEPTH 10 (2013), available at 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/zeroac
cess_indepth.pdf.  
 15. See VIHUL ET AL., supra note 8, at 5. As discussed infra Part III with descriptions of 
each of the botnets, criminal activity that produces this income can derive from actions such as 
click-fraud, identity theft, password and bank account theft. 
 16. Global Botnet Threat Activity Map, TREND MICRO, http://www.trendmicro.com/us 
/security-intelligence/current-threat-activity/global-botnet-map/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 
2014). 
 17. See Paul Hyman, Cybercrime: It’s Serious, But Exactly How Serious?, 56 COMMC’NS 
OF THE ACM 18, 18 (2013) (noting difference in estimates of cybercrime damages as reported by 
Symantec Corp. and McAfee Inc.).  
 18. See THE RENDON GROUP, CONFICKER WORKING GROUP: LESSONS LEARNED 13 
(2011). This report was funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and 
Technology Directorate to study the Conficker Working Group and report on its success and 
challenges. Id. at 2.  
 19. See id. at 26 (stating that “the  [federal] government’s coordination with the Working 
Group was limited and contributed little to the private sector effort.”); see also id. at 19 (describing 
the informal communication between some members of the Conficker Working Group and 
various agencies).  
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B. The Conficker Working Group 
In October of 2008, Microsoft (MS) issued a “critical” security 
patch for certain Windows and Windows-server software because, in 
part, the malicious use of the vulnerability to install a computer worm 
known as Conficker could result in a computer being recruited into a 
botnet.20 Ironically, releases of vulnerability information and patches 
are known to sometimes create the opposite result; malware can be 
propagated seeking to exploit the weakness before computers are 
updated. The Conficker worm, discovered in November 2008, sought 
to infect computers through this MS vulnerability, however it was 
different from other worms in its sophistication, growth, and 
resiliency.21 While Conficker utilized a C&C framework whereby bots 
contact the central server for instructions, it also implemented a more 
dynamic communications structure. Conficker’s first version used 
mathematical algorithms to generate multiple, dynamically changing, 
C&C locations from 250 domain names each (rather than IP addresses) 
from five top-level domains. Subsequent evolutions of the virus 
increased the number of control domain names significantly (“tens of 
thousands”),22 and at one point resorted to peer-to-peer 
communications (rather than C&C), all in order to avoid detection and 
destruction.  
 Communication between the bot and control location was 
encrypted, and the strength of encryption increased in subsequent 
versions of Conficker.23 For purposes of this discussion, it is enough to 
note that as security measures and tactics ratcheted up, each step was 
met with renewed sophistication in the worm architecture. Within one 
year, despite efforts of the security community, an estimated five to six 
million IP addresses (and perhaps up to 13 million computers) were 
infected with some version of Conficker, and therefore were potential 
weapons in a botnet arsenal.24  
 
 20. See id. at 3.  
 21. See id. at 5. 
 22. DAVE PISCITELLO, ICANN SECURITIES TEAM, CONFICKER SUMMARY AND REVIEW 17 
(2010), available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/conficker-summary-review-07 
may10-en.pdf. 
 23. For a chronology of the evolution and different variations of Conficker, see KADRI 
KASKA, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, CONFICKER 
CONSIDERATIONS IN LAW AND POLICY 8–15 (2012) (a report of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence in Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia).  
 24. See PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 10. 
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Throughout the battle against Conficker, the identity of the 
worm’s author was unknown, and it remains unknown today.25 In 
addition, the purpose of the potentially powerful botnet was, and 
remains today, unknown.26 This uncertainty and yet large potential for 
harm increased the sense of urgency to take action to defeat the 
potential use of the botnet.27 At the outset, security firms, university 
researchers, and a variety of private entities worked in parallel, with 
information sharing based on personal trust, to develop methods to 
destroy the worm and to inform the public about patches.28 It was not 
until a symposium on domain name system (DNS) security in Atlanta, 
Georgia in February 2009, however, that a coordinated effort began by 
means of the informal Conficker Working Group.29 Representatives 
from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) were present at the meeting, and their cooperation became 
fundamental to the Conficker botnet takedown because of the 
fraudulent use of domain names to direct bots to a control server.30 In 
order to takedown a botnet with a C&C server, discovering the identity 
of the server is key; knowing the identity and location of the server will 
allow measures to be taken to disrupt the communications or shut down 
the sever itself, perhaps even by physical means.31  
When members of the Working Group decrypted the algorithm 
for the dynamic communications, they then determined to buy the 
domains from Internet registrars ahead of the automated Conficker 
program in order to block its orders and updates to individual 
computers.32 However, the sheer volume of domains utilized proved 
too costly to purchase in bulk, even for a resource rich entity such as 
Microsoft who was involved in the effort.33 In addition, the domains 
used different country codes, and therefore increased the complexity of 
the botnet mitigation efforts.34 Although it was surmised that the 
 
 25. See KASKA, supra note 23, at 18. 
 26. Id.  
 27. See PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 12–14. 
 28. See id. at 5.  
 29. See id. at 7. 
 30. See id. at 6.  
 31. See GRIZZARD, supra note 5, at 1.  
 32. See THE RENDON GROUP, supra note 18, at 16–18. 
 33. See PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 6. 
 34. See THE RENDON GROUP, supra note 18, at 7. 
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Conficker worm originated from the Ukraine,35 many of the domain 
names generated in the algorithm were of Chinese denomination.36 To 
solve this conundrum of global reach, ICANN took the lead by 
agreeing: (1) to waive domain name registration fees as far as possible 
for the Working Group; and (2) to give prior notice to over 100 top-
level country domain registrars that certain domain names would be 
automatically registered by Conficker.37 Thus, the registries could 
block the registration of C&C names by Conficker; this coordinated 
action rendered the botnet unable to communicate with or direct the 
botnet, effectively disabling it. Reporting on the collaborative effort to 
takedown Conficker, an ICANN document makes two interesting 
comments. First, it recognized the ground-breaking nature of the group 
composition, saying that, “The operational response to Conficker is 
perhaps as landmark an event as the worm itself.”38 In contrast, 
however, it also stated that, “The community cannot rely on all 
contractual matters [such as waiving fees] to be so easily handled for 
all future incidents.”39  
Although law enforcement engagement with the Conficker 
Working Group and potential botnet was minimal, its attention to 
cybercrime was not. Since botnets are the vehicle for accomplishing 
many types of cybercriminal activity, law enforcement also became 
directly involved in attempts to disable those threats. 
C. The FBI and DoJ 
The Coreflood computer virus infected an estimated two million 
computers globally and was active for at least ten years.40 When the 
Coreflood virus installed on a user’s computer, it was then possible to 
enlist it as a bot in a future botnet.41 In particular, Coreflood could log 
user keystrokes, obtain account passwords, and facilitate bank fraud 
and theft.42  
 
 35. Id. at 6. But some also hypothesized that the author was a nation–state. Id. at 9. 
 36. See id. at 19. 
 37. See id. at 20–21. 
 38. PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 1.  
 39. Id. at 14. 
 40. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dep’t of Justice Takes Action to Disable Int’l 
Botnet (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/newhaven/press-releases/2011/nh041311.htm. 
 41. Coreflood is both the name of the virus and the name of the botnet.  
 42. See DoJ Press Release, supra note 40. 
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Not surprisingly, the breadth and depth of Coreflood infections 
and resulting botnet harms spurred an FBI investigation that resulted in 
legal action by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ); importantly, 
Coreflood was the first law enforcement and legal action to shut down 
an active botnet.43 The initiating complaint described a botnet in 
general as “inherently a creature of crime,”44 and “a threat to national 
security.”45 The specific charges against the unknown Coreflood botnet 
operators included wire fraud, bank fraud, and unauthorized access to 
electronic communications.46 Estimates of Coreflood damages 
exceeded $20 million.47 
The Coreflood botnet operated similarly to the previously 
described Conficker design (except at a simpler level), as the C&C 
server located at certain IP addresses would change domain names in 
order to evade disabling.48 However, domain name changes were 
programmed in the malware to occur twice per month, and those 
specific domain names were uncovered by the investigation.49 The 
legal action was designed not to arrest and imprison the perpetrators of 
the botnet, as yet unknown, but to stop the operation of the malicious 
software installed on unsuspecting user computers. On April 11, 2011, 
the DoJ announced that under the authority of a temporary restraining 
order it had seized command and control servers and redirected botnet 
traffic to substitute servers, disabling the functions of the botnet and 
giving victims the opportunity to cleanse the Coreflood software from 
their computers.50  
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Complaint at 3, U.S. v. John Does 1-13, No. 3:1-CV-561 (D. Conn. Apr. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter Coreflood complaint]. 
 45. Id. at 3–4. 
 46. See id. at 10–12 (alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, and 2511, 
respectively). 
 47. NAT’L CYBER INVESTIGATIVE JOINT TASK FORCE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
OPERATION CLEAN SLATE 3, available at http://www.wpcug.org/Downloads/National%20Cyber 
%20Investigative%20Joint%20Task%20Force.pdf.  
 48. See Coreflood Complaint, supra note 44, at 5–7.  
 49. Id. at 6–7. 
 50. See DoJ Press Release, supra note 40. Jurisdiction was granted based on evidence of 
the large number of computers infected in the United States, allegations of specific instances of 
bank and wire fraud in the United States and the unauthorized access to computers in interstate 
commerce under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). See Coreflood Complaint, supra 
note 44, at 3.  
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In particular, the DoJ seized 29 domain names and 5 servers that 
were a part of the C&C structure, and concurrently substituted FBI-
managed servers in the C&C structure.51 In addition, the TRO granted 
permission for the substituted servers to send a temporary disabling 
command to the malware.52 Sending this “stop” command was 
authorized “only to computers reasonably determined to be in the 
United States.”53 The DoJ was prohibited from accessing any content 
information from the infected computer, its access restricted to data of 
“originating IP address, network port, and the date and time of 
transmission.”54 The extraordinary remedy allowing the government to 
substitute servers in the C&C infrastructure and send electronic 
instructions to individual computers was based, in part, on the “special 
needs, including the need to protect the public and to perform 
community caretaking functions, that are beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement . . . .”55  
Meanwhile, security firms continued to work on a lasting patch 
for the Coreflood vulnerability.56 In addition, evidence showed that the 
overall result of the actions rid the Coreflood virus from 90% of 
infected computers in the United States.57 Included in this number were 
private parties, businesses, governments, hospitals, and universities.58  
Stopping the Coreflood botnet operations would only be a 
temporary patch, however, if the malware itself were not eliminated 
from user computers. Victim notification, numbering in the hundreds 
of thousands, occurred primarily by sharing IP addresses of infected 
customers with the respective Internet Service Provider (ISP) and 
requesting that a form notification be delivered to those customers.59 In 
arguably a further extension of the extraordinary means taken to disable 
 
 51. See DoJ Press Release, supra note 40.  
 52. Temporary Restraining Order at 5–6, U.S. v. John Does 1-13, No. 3:11-CV-561 (D. 
Conn. Apr. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Coreflood TRO]. 
 53. Id. at 6. 
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. Id. at 4.  
 56. Supplemental Memo. in Support of Prelim. Inj. at 5, U.S. v. John Does 1–13, No. 3:11-
CV-561 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Supplemental Memo].  
 57. Id. at 10–11. 
 58. Coordinated Law Enforcement Action Leads to Massive Reduction in Size of 
International Botnet, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog 
/coordinated-law-enforcement-action-leads-massive-reduction-size-international-botnet.  
 59. See Supplemental Memo, supra note 56, at 5–6. 
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the botnet, the FBI sent direct notices to “Identifiable Victims,”60 
including “seventeen state or local government agencies, including one 
policy department; three airports; two defense contractors; five banks 
or financial institutions; approximately thirty colleges or universities; 
approximately twenty hospital or health care companies; and hundreds 
of businesses”61 explaining that they could authorize the FBI to delete 
the Coreflood virus from their computers.62 With written consent, the 
government uninstalled the software directly from the user’s 
computer.63  
Stopping the Coreflood virus involved cross-border action. The 
botnet servers were located around the world, outside the jurisdictional 
reach of U.S. courts. In order to disable the botnet, the FBI targeted 
what it could reach within the United States; it requested and the court 
ordered the domain name providers to “impose a registry lock on the 
Internet domain name[s]” including any account associated with it.64 
Stopping with the seizure of domestic C&C computers would not have 
disabled the botnet for any length of time. The government strategy 
was effective because it avoided ICANN’s participation by using a 
court order issued to the domain providers to accomplish the same 
result. Providers were primarily located in the United States, however 
some were also in Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Australia; 
voluntary cooperation of the domain name providers in these foreign 
jurisdictions assisted the takedown.65   
The Coreflood takedown was subject to criticism from various 
quarters. The action was labeled “a first in the U.S. . . . that . . . gave 
law enforcement permission to interfere directly with computers 
belonging to users who weren't being investigated, or charged with any 
crime.”66 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) celebrated the 
takedown of the botnet, but raised questions about the wisdom of a 
strategy that included an “extraordinary” governmental intrusion into 
individual computers; an EFF representative commented that the risk 
 
 60. See id. at 6.  
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. at 7. 
 63. Id. at 12–13. The government did not request court approval for uninstalling the virus 
because it did so only upon the user’s written permission. Id.  
 64. Coreflood TRO, supra note 52, at 6.  
 65. See id. at Schedule A. 
 66. Chris Paoli, Feds Move Forward on Coreflood Botnet Removal, GCN (Apr. 29, 2011), 
http://gcn.com/Articles/2011/04/28/ECG-Feds-To-Remove-Coreflood. 
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of harm was too great and that “[i]f nothing horrible comes of this, it 
will be because of a combination of sheer luck and surprising politeness 
on behalf of the malware authors.”67 Others questioned the precedent 
set by such an aggressive posture because “[i]t’s getting the FBI 
involved in an area where they traditionally haven’t been involved. 
What’s stopping [the FBI] from going all the way to the extreme and 
shutting down political discourse they don’t like?”68 On the opposite 
end of the spectrum, some questioned whether the FBI went far enough. 
Since the botnet was a threat to the security of the Internet, should the 
FBI have gone further and cleaned users’ computers even without 
explicit permission? An informal survey, directed at the security 
community, found support for this more aggressive approach.69 
Microsoft’s first civil lawsuit to dismantle botnets was launched 
before the Coreflood action, however its strategy can be viewed in 
contrast to the law enforcement action and the voluntary Conficker 
collaborative effort, and the inherent difficulties with each. Though MS 
took the lead as plaintiff in each of the cases discussed, security 
professionals, academics, and other interested parties were crucial to 
the takedown efforts.70 For purposes of much of the following 
discussion however, based on their lead plaintiff role, the discussion 
refers only to Microsoft. 
 
 67. Dan Kaplan, Coreflood Takedown May Lead to Trouble, SC MAG. (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/254827,coreflood-takedown-may-lead-to-trouble.aspx. 
 68. Id.; see also Bruce Schneier, Hijacking the Coreflood Botnet, SCHNEIER ON SEC. BLOG 
(May 2, 2011, 6:52 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/hijacking 
_the_c.html (supporting the action as necessary to preserve the Internet, but questioning whether 
it created a “slippery slope” for more widespread actions). 
 69. See Paul Ducklin, FBI Takes On Coreflood Botnet—But is This a Step Too Far?, 
NAKED SECURITY (Apr. 28, 2011), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/04/28/fbi-takes-on 
-coreflood-botnet-step-too-far/. 
 70. See discussion infra Part II.  
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II. THE FIRST MICROSOFT OFFENSIVE  
In February 2010, Microsoft announced the “first of its kind” 
takedown of a botnet based on collaborative technical and legal 
action.71 The Waledac botnet takedown targeted a botnet that could 
potentially send 1.5 billion unsolicited spam emails per day.72 Among 
others, the emails included solicitations for fraudulent products and 
services, malware that enlisted more computers into the botnet, and the 
installation of malicious software that stole financial and personal 
information from the user.73 In addition, the botnet software modified 
Microsoft Window’s operating system, suspended authentic security 
updates, and caused users to install fake, injurious “security” 
software.74 Waledac owners sold the use of the botnet as a service to 
third parties, therefore dispersing the various unauthorized and 
criminal activities across the globe.75 Microsoft received thousands of 
complaints76 from customers, who believed that the malfunction of 
their computer was due to defects in Microsoft products, and who 
believed that the spam email originated from Microsoft.77  
The technical team identified over 200 domain names used in the 
C&C architecture of the botnet.78 While a detailed technical description 
is beyond the scope of this article, a few aspects of the Waledac 
structure are relevant to understanding how the legal action and court 
 
 71. See Tim Cranton, Cracking Down on Botnets, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Feb. 24, 
2010, 6:16 PM), http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2010/02/24/cracking-down-on-botnets/ (“This 
legal and industry operation against Waledac is the first of its kind, but it won’t be the last. With 
this action, done in cooperation with experts from Shadowserver, the University of Washington, 
Symantec, University of Mannheim, Technical University in Vienna, International Secure 
Systems Lab, the University of Bonn and others, we’re building on other important work across 
the global security community to combat botnets.”). 
 72. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Temporary 
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause RE Preliminary Injunction at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. 
John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Waledac Brief]; see also 
Brian Krebs, Microsoft Ambushes Waledac Botnet, Shutters Whistleblower Site, KREBS ON 
SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2010, 11:33 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/02/microsoft-ambushes 
-waledac-botnet-shutters-whistleblower-site/. 
 73. See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 16–18.  
 74. See Complaint at 8, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. 
Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Waledac Complaint]. 
 75. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. John 
Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Waledac Findings of Fact].  
 76. See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 3.  
 77. Id. at 8–9. 
 78. Id. at 6. 
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orders were essential components of disabling the botnet. The Waledac 
infrastructure was tiered, described by Microsoft as consisting of 
Spammer Nodes, Repeater Nodes, TSL servers, and at the top-level the 
Main Command and Control servers.79 The Spammer Nodes consisted 
of individual user computers infected with the controlling botnet 
malware, and situated behind firewalls rather than connected directly 
to the Internet. Spammer Nodes automatically communicated with and 
followed the orders of the controller of the botnet through a system that 
utilized the Repeater Nodes. Repeater Nodes were used for several 
purposes, including both as a communicating device between the 
different layers of the botnet, and as DNS servers, which resolve an IP 
address to a domain name. A third layer consisted of the TSL servers, 
acting as a wall to obfuscate and protect the identity of the ultimate 
botnet controller. Communications would pass through the TSL servers 
to the last layer, the Main Command and Control Servers, which were 
directly controlled by the owner(s) of the botnet, otherwise known as 
the bot herder(s).80 In addition, DNS fast flux servers were utilized to 
constantly change the domain names associated with IP addresses with 
the root zone at Internet registrars. In summary, the design of the botnet 
infrastructure made technical remediation difficult to accomplish.81  
Microsoft designed an offensive strategy to disrupt the 277 
domain names that facilitated communications among the tiers of the 
botnet. As they explained, “[t]hese 273 [4 were later added] domains 
continuously control the ability of the computers that make up the 
Waledac botnet to communicate with each other and to grow the 
botnet,”82 and “[t]hese domains have no legitimate purpose. . . . The 
domains’ sole purpose is to await requests from botnet computers and 
instruct them on how to continue communicating with each other and 
to infect new user computers.”83 Without a communication structure, 
the botnet would be unable to operate, even though individual 
 
 79. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74. 
 80. Id. at 7. 
 81. See id. at 7–10. It was difficult to reach the spammer node, individual user computers, 
to stop the infection because they were behind firewalls; difficult to reach the Fast Flux servers 
because they were routed and hidden behind the Repeater Node computers; difficult to reach the 
Repeater Node servers because their location was changing due to the continuous action by the 
Fast Flux servers; and difficult to reach the Command and Control servers because their identity 
was protected by the Repeater Nodes and the lack of a direct connection to Spammer Nodes.  
 82. Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 6. 
 83. Id. at 7. 
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computers would still be infected with malicious software. The adopted 
strategy involved taking swift and secret action to take the botnet 
domain names off the Internet before the botnet controllers could 
change their location.84 Therefore, Microsoft sued 27 John Doe 
defendants that were registered as the owners of the domain names, 
based on allegations of violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA), CAN-SPAM Act, Electronic Communications and 
Privacy Act (ECPA), false designation of origin and trademark dilution 
under the Lanham Act, trespass to chattels, and unjust enrichment and 
conversion.85 Importantly, Microsoft requested an ex parte proceeding 
and a Preliminary Injunction to instruct the domain name registrar, 
VeriSign, to “lock” the domain names while it attempted to identify the 
owners of the domains and serve process upon them.86  
A. Legal Allegations 
In general, one of the most often applicable statutes used to pursue 
prosecution for hacking or the propagation of malicious software is the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.87 A criminal statute, the CFAA grants 
a civil right of action for criminal acts when certain injuries occur.88 
The applicable sections of the CFAA provide a civil remedy of 
damages, an injunction and equitable remedies when a person 
intentionally gains unauthorized access, or exceeds authorized access, 
to a computer used in interstate commerce and either causes aggregate 
loss of at least $5,000, affects medical treatment of an individual, 
personal physical injury, or causes a threat to public health or safety.89 
Microsoft alleged that the Waledac botnet accessed its computers and 
those of its customers intentionally and without authorization, to obtain 
information, commit fraud, and to cause damage by transferring 
malicious computer programs and code.90 
 
 84. See Waledac: The Legal Action Plan, MICROSOFT SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REPORT, 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/story/default.aspx#!waledac_legal [hereinafter Legal 
Action Plan].  
 85. See infra Part III.A.  
 86. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84; see also infra Part III.B.  
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). See generally Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 2–4, 11–12 (2012) (describing the CFAA 
as primarily an anti-hacking statute). 
 88. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). The additional requirements are found in id. 
§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V).  
 90. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 13. 
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Waledac sent hundreds of thousands of spam emails to 
individuals. Microsoft, in its capacity as an Internet service provider, 
for example a provider of the Hotmail service, was able to file a civil 
action for violations of the CAN-SPAM Act of 200391 based in part on 
false header and deceptive use of the emails.92 Microsoft also alleged 
violations based on the absence of return addresses, opt-out provisions, 
and the lack of clear indications of the emails’ advertising nature.93 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)94 is also a 
criminal statute that allows for a civil remedy, prohibiting interception 
of electronic communications without authorization.95 Microsoft 
alleged that the Waledac botnet intercepted and interfered with both 
customer and Microsoft emails in storage at Microsoft, at its customers’ 
computers, and “within Microsoft’s licensed operating system.”96  
Trespass to chattels is a common law tort that has been used to 
pursue remedies for previous electronic intrusion or unauthorized use 
cases, and the conversion allegation is a related theory.97 Microsoft 
alleged trespass to chattels based on the harm caused by the intentional, 
unsolicited emails sent by the botnets, and the unauthorized access to 
its computers.98  
 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2006). 
 92. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 13.  
 93. Id.  
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
 95. See DIRECTV v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Section 2511 provides in 
relevant part that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who . . .  
intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . electronic communication’ is subject to criminal penalties or 
civil suit by the federal government. Appearing later in the same chapter, § 2520 expressly 
authorizes private suits by ‘any person whose . . . electronic communication is intercepted . . . in 
violation of this chapter.’ Both sections reference the interception of electronic communications. 
The linguistic interlock between the two provisions could not be tighter, nor more obviously 
deliberate: § 2511(1)(a) renders unlawful the unauthorized interception of electronic 
communications, including encrypted satellite television broadcasts, while § 2520(a) authorizes 
private suit against those who have engaged in such activities.”) (citations omitted).  
 96. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 15.  
 97. See T. Luis de Guzman, Unleashing a Cure for the Botnet Zombie Plague: Cybertorts, 
Counterstrikes, and Privileges, 59 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 527, 531–38 (2010) (reviewing cases 
under trespass theories and arguing for extension of negligence theory). See generally Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age, 44 TULSA L. REV. 677 (2009) 
(discussing trespass to chattels in Internet cases and arguing for a self help right for victims).  
 98. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 17. 
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The Lanham Act dilution99 and false designation of origin100 
provisions were used by a business early in the digital era to 
successfully pursue a civil case when the spammer used false email 
headers.101 Microsoft alleged that the Waledac botnet used the 
trademarks of Microsoft, Windows, and Hotmail in ways that were 
misleading and caused confusion with customers about the source of 
the spam email and fake anti-virus software offered as MS 
antispyware.102 In addition, the association of Microsoft’s famous 
trademarks with the malicious software caused “blurring and dilution 
by tarnishment” when it “creat[ed] keys and writing entries under a 
registry path that include[ed] the Microsoft marks,”103 all remedies that 
would prove helpful in later botnet takedowns.104 
Lastly, Microsoft alleged liability for the botnet’s activities based 
on the general common law conception of unjust enrichment.105 They 
argued that botnet operators “profited unjustly”106 by knowingly using 
Microsoft computers and customer computers without authorization, 
and by using Microsoft licensed software without permission. 
Microsoft appealed to principles of equity to argue for disgorgement of 
the ill-gotten profits and for payment of damages.107 
Microsoft’s combination of legal theories of civil liability 
established a legal framework for tackling the takedown of a botnet, a 
framework that it would use repeatedly to disable subsequent botnets, 
and upon which it would expand future requests for court permission 
to take more broad reaching actions. Legal theory alone, however, 
 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
 100. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).  
 101. America Online v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551–52 (E.D. Va. 1998).  
 102. See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 19. 
 103. Id. at 16–17.  
 104. Section 1116 of the Lanham Act states: 
[W]ith respect to a violation that consists of using a counterfeit mark in connection 
with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services, the court may, 
upon ex parte application, grant an order under subsection (a) of this section 
pursuant to this subsection providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks 
involved in such violation and the means of making such marks, and records 
documenting the manufacturer, sale, or receipt of things involved in such violation. 
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2013).  
 105. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 18. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
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would not be adequate to takedown the botnet; the legal procedure 
strategy was essential for success. 
B. Legal Strategy and Procedure 
Microsoft designed a procedural legal strategy described in its 
Legal Action Plan.108 The legal approach to instituting a takedown 
included major challenges, as described by Microsoft: 
Cease and desist letters would not force immediate action. Similarly, 
domain takedown is inexact and somewhat limited under typical 
ICANN procedures. For example, ICANN’s Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) provides a relatively long 
window in which bad actors would be able to register new domains, 
update the botnet code, or take other evasive actions to move the 
botnet while the ICANN process unfolded.109 
1. Ex Parte Proceeding 
Instead of appealing to ICANN and the domain resolution process 
to freeze the botnet domain names as was done in Conficker, Microsoft 
asked a District Court for an ex parte proceeding without notice to the 
defendants (for three days), in order to prevent the bot herders from 
automatically moving their C&C structure and destroying evidence.110  
The precedent cited for the request was the 2009 Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) emergency ex parte proceeding to dismantle an ISP 
that hosted extensive criminal activities, including the control of 
botnets.111 In the previous case, the FTC was granted an ex parte TRO 
without notice to the ISP because to do otherwise would allow the 
 
 108. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84. 
 109. Id.  
 110. See App. of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order and Order 
to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj., Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (LMB/JFA) 
(E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2010); Microsoft Corp.’s Motion for a Protective Order Sealing Documents, 
Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2010) (citing FED. R. 
CIV. PROC. 26(c)(1)). 
 111. FTC v. Pricewert, LLC, No. 09-2407 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2009); see also Press Release, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Permanently Shuts Down Notorious Rogue Internet Service Provider 
(May 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/05/ftc-permanently-shuts 
-down-notorious-rogue-internet-service. Microsoft’s approach mirrored this case in many 
procedural ways although the legal theories differed.  
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defendant to dispose of evidence of wrongdoing and move its 
operations.112 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for ex parte hearings, 
but the court will normally require that the plaintiff first produce 
evidence of attempted notification to the defendant.113 Microsoft 
requested that notification be delayed until after the domains were 
rendered inoperable; otherwise the botnet would move its location to 
avoid disruption. Microsoft’s legal argument relied on a 1979 case, In 
re Louis Vuitton Et Fils S.A.,114 in which the court allowed the ex parte 
order without notification because to do otherwise would allow the 
defendant to dispose of physical evidence. Importantly, Microsoft 
provided detailed information about how it would satisfy due process 
and provide notice to the defendants at the later time.115 MS pledged to 
utilize all methods of notification possible, including notification by 
means of: 
(1) [T]he Hague Convention on Service Abroad by sending the 
Complaint, Summons and all other documents to the Chinese 
Ministry of Justice; (2) alternative methods, including service and 
notice by email, facsimile, and by mail; and (3) publication of all 
relevant pleadings on a website Microsoft set up solely to provide 
the domain registrants with notice.116 
Microsoft faced the possibility that at least some of the domain names 
were “hijacked” by the botnet; thus, they named additional John Doe 
defendants in order to preserve the rights of any innocent victims.117 
The domain names included Chinese registrants, also likely falsified, 
 
 112. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause at 2–3, FTC v. 
Pricewert, LLC, No. 09-2407 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2009).  
 113. FED. R. CIV. P. 65 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining order 
without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:   
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant 
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and 
(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give 
notice and the reasons why it should not be required. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (2014). 
 114. 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979).  
 115. See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 24–27. 
 116. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84.  
 117. Id.  
08_ARTICLE_HILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2015  1:51 PM 
184 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
therefore Microsoft also promised service of process via the Chinese 
Minister of Justice.118  
2. Emergency Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction  
In concert with the ex parte proceeding, Microsoft requested, and 
received, an emergency temporary restraining order enjoining the 
malicious activities by the John Does controlling the botnet, and an 
order to VeriSign, the domain registry, to shut down the domains at that 
level.119 This was the essential action needed to disrupt the 
communications structure and disable the use of the botnet: targeting 
the domain names acting in the C&C role. Without receiving updated 
instructions from the command server, the individual bots would 
become inactive. Specifically, the preliminary injunction directed 
VeriSign to “lock” the domains, remove them from the zone file, 
disallow any changes, hold the domains in escrow, and preserve 
evidence of misconduct.120  
The legal strategy included sensitivity to the uniqueness of the 
lawsuit. Studying precedents of the Eastern District of Virginia, MS 
crafted its requests for injunction in order to respond to the concerns 
found in previous decisions involving extraordinary procedures.121 
Microsoft paid attention to its relationship with the court, noting that 
they, “worked very hard to develop and maintain credibility with the 
Court by ensuring that its [our] arguments were supported by 
substantial evidence and law, and also by offering timely submissions, 
avoiding undue delay, and ensuring that it [we] worked with counsel 
who was familiar with the Court’s practices.”122 
The court granted the preliminary TRO and subsequently the 
permanent order, on the basis that Microsoft was likely to succeed on 
violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, trespass to chattels, 
unjust enrichment, conversion, and negligence.123 Microsoft was 
granted 14 days under the TRO to shut down the botnet, and it was 
 
 118. Id.  
 119. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Prelim. Inj., 
Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter 
Waledac TRO].  
 120. Id. at 3–4. 
 121. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Waledac TRO, supra note 119, at 2.   
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ready to act quickly. The domains were shut down within 48 hours, and 
within the next 24 hours the Chinese defendants were served with 
notice of the pending lawsuit. Email notices were sent to all addresses 
of the domain holders listed with the registries, and the takedown action 
was widely publicized.124  
Microsoft’s attention to the possibility of innocent parties proved 
prescient. Stephen Paluck, owner of debtbgonesite.com, claimed his 
innocence, and argued that he had no knowledge that his domain was a 
part of the botnet.125 Paluck had transferred control of the domain to a 
third person, and stated that he did not know who controlled the 
domain. As a result, Microsoft purchased the domain name from 
Paluck and assisted him in the cleanup of his computer.126 Another 
domain name was used as “name-services.com;” after ensuring that this 
entity shutoff the domains used in the botnet, Microsoft also dropped 
this entity from its lawsuit.127  
C. Default Judgment  
The Ex Parte Order for an Emergency Temporary Restraining 
Order, followed by Service of Process and the grant of a Temporary 
Restraining Order, culminated in a Default Judgment that transferred 
the domain names to Microsoft.128 As noted in the Findings of Facts:  
[T]he only way to enjoin effectively the Doe Defendants’ operation 
and propagation of the Waledac Botnet is to permanently deprive 
them of the Botnet Domains and transfer control of the domains to 
an entity that will ensure that they are not re-infected and revived as 
part of the Waledac Botnet. Microsoft is a natural candidate to be 
the entity in control of these domains because it is willing to bear 
 
 124. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84. The details of how quickly Microsoft acted and 
the extensive ways in which it sought to identify and give notice to the John Doe defendants are 
outside the scope of this general article. In brief, documents were translated to Chinese and posted 
on an approved website. No responses were received, although Microsoft noted that at one point 
after the takedown became public its noticeofpleadings.com site was probed by entities from 
Russian IP addresses. See Waledac Findings of Fact, supra note 75, at 16.  
 125. Microsoft Corp.’s Status Report at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-
CV-156 (E.D. Va. March 5, 2010). 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. R.I.P Waledac: Undoing the Damage of a Botnet, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG  
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2010/09/08/r-i-p-waledac-undoing-the-damage 
-of-a-botnet/. VeriSign was ordered to transfer 276 domains to a registrar chosen by Microsoft, 
which would then transfer the domains directly to Microsoft. Id. 
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the costs associated with ensuring that the domain registrations to 
not lapse, it has the technical expertise to ensure that the domains 
are not once again taken over by the Waledac Botnet, and it has no 
pecuniary interest in controlling those domains.129 
III. MICROSOFT TAKEDOWNS EVOLVE 
Microsoft executed seven more botnet takedowns in the next three 
years. Five of these were undertaken without law enforcement 
partnerships, while the two most recent ones in 2013 were collaborative 
in nature. The five Microsoft led takedowns primarily built upon the 
legal procedure and framework first applied during the Waledac action. 
A request for an ex parte proceeding without notice and a Temporary 
Restraining Order and Injunction was followed by swift action to serve 
notice to the defendants. The legal theories argued by these cases also 
built upon the strategy established in the Waledac takedown. Yet each 
one of these takedowns progressively added to Microsoft’s arsenal 
against malicious botnets by addressing additional issues in each 
unique case. The following descriptions of the botnet remediations 
focus on these additional developments, acknowledging that they build 
upon the previously designed fundamental strategy. 
A. Rustock 
The Rustock botnet was estimated to have infected over one 
million individual computers worldwide in 2011, and estimated to 
produce 20%–60% of worldwide spam.130 At one point it was estimated 
to be the largest purveyor of spam in the world, dubbed the “King of 
Spam.”131 Spam emails generated by the Rustock were primarily used 
to sell unregulated generic pharmaceuticals, particularly those properly 
manufactured by Pfizer, but they also targeted Hotmail users with false 
lottery scams, for example, and caused loss of financial information 
and associated damages.132 Rustock was particularly virulent because 
it infected the user’s software so completely, and at such a fundamental 
 
 129. See Waledac Findings of Fact, supra note 75, at 20. 
 130. Complaint at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 
9, 2011) [hereinafter Rustock Complaint].  
 131. Id. at 13. 
 132. Id. 
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level, that the average user could not detect the infection or clean the 
malicious software from their computer without technical assistance.133  
Microsoft identified 96 Rustock C&C servers located in the 
United States and named 5 data centers that hosted related botnet 
domains.134 Similarly to the Waledac botnet takedown, Microsoft 
requested that the domains be blocked by third parties and removed 
from the zone root file in order to disrupt the communications of the 
botnet.135 Before granting a preliminary injunction, the court requested 
legal authority for the order to non-party third parties.136 Microsoft 
argued the All Writs Act of 1789 as the legal basis for the order, which 
states: “The Supreme Court and all court established by Act of 
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law.”137 Courts have used the All Writs Act as the basis for orders to 
third parties ranging from telephone companies that must participate in 
wiretaps, to individuals who must stop interfering with school 
desegregation.138  
Another new development in the Rustock takedown was the 
seizure all of the computers, files, and related information from the 
location of the servers rather than focusing the remedy on the IP 
addresses; this was necessary because, “the masterminds behind 
Rustock designed their infected computers to receive instructions from 
Internet protocol addresses tied to specific command-and-control 
machines.”139 The court order allowed Microsoft attorneys and experts 
to accompany U.S. marshals during the seizure to determine the 
“computers, servers, electronic data storage devices, or media”140 to be 
 
 133. Microsoft Corp.’s Application for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order, 
Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 10–11, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 
1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Rustock TRO Application].  
 134. See Rustock Complaint, supra note 130, at 8. 
 135. See Rustock TRO Application, supra note 133, at 2. 
 136. Microsoft Supp. Brief in Support of Application for an Emergency Temporary 
Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 1, Microsoft Corp. 
v. John Does 1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Rustock Supplemental 
Brief]. 
 137. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). 
 138. See Rustock Supplemental Brief, supra note 136, at 2–3.  
 139. Nick Wingfield, Spam Network Shut Down, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703328404576207173861008758. 
 140. Order for Prelim. Inj. at 8, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 9, 2011).  
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seized. The premise for seizing the computers and related physical 
materials rested upon the “overwhelming risk” that the botnet would 
move to another location and continue its operation.141 Importantly, the 
Lanham Act provided the legal basis for Microsoft’s seizure of the 
offending articles and records because they were products of or related 
to trademark infringement.142  
Thus, the Rustock case added legal specificity for court authority 
to order third parties to botnet takedowns by purging IP addresses and 
domain names from the Internet, and preserving evidence. 
Furthermore, it established the Lanham Act as a viable vehicle for 
Microsoft to seize physical botnet property and increased the ability of 
Microsoft to pursue the eradication of botnets through the civil system. 
As a result, security experts found that Rustock produced spam 
“nosedived,”143 as the takedown was speculated to be the “largest 
takedown in the history of the Internet.”144 For example, one entity 
reported a decrease from one to two thousand Rustock spam emails per 
second, to merely one to two spam emails per second.145 
B. Kelihos  
In 2011, Microsoft sued an individual and limited liability 
company located in the Czech Republic, and John Does, in order to 
disable a botnet known as Kelihos.146 While both known defendants 
were located outside of the United States, jurisdiction in the Virginia 
court was based on the business that they did in Virginia, the malicious 
code directed at persons in Virginia, and the continued botnet activity 
involving Virginia-based computers.147 
 
 141. See Rustock TRO Application, supra note 133, at 28.  
 142. Temporary Restraining Order and Seizure Order at 6–9, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 
1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2011). Paragraph F of the order states that the seizure 
is authorized under § 1116(d) of the Lanham Act, however the judge added a handwritten note at 
the end of the order that “[a]ll actions undertaken under the authority of this Order shall be in 
strict compliance with 15 U.S.C. 1116,” implying that the court was keenly aware of the 
significance of this action. Id. at 11.  
 143. See Brian Krebs, Rustock Botnet Flatlined, Spam Volumes Plummet, KREBS ON 
SECURITY (Mar. 18, 2011, 10:04 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/03/rustock-botnet-flat 
lined-spam-volumes-plummet/. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Complaint at 1, Microsoft Corp. v. Piatti, No. 1:11-CV-1017 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 2011) 
[hereinafter Kelihos Complaint].  
 147. Id. at 6–7. 
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The owners of the two IP addresses had issued 21 subdomains that 
were an active part of the Kelihos botnet.148 The Kelihos structure was 
similar to the Waledac botnet, and Microsoft used similar legal tactics 
and court proceedings to disable it, including orders to third parties to 
freeze and disable the domains and preserve evidence.149 However, it 
added a negligence allegation to the action, arguing that the act of 
hosting subdomains and registering owners imposed a duty on the 
defendants not to allow the IP addresses and domain names to be used 
for malicious, botnet purposes; the basis of the duty being, among 
others, the “domain registration and IP hosting agreements and policies 
entered into by defendants . . . [in their] domain registration 
agreements.”150 Additionally, Microsoft alleged that the defendants 
knew about, assisted, and benefited from the malicious actions of the 
subdomain holders.151 
Microsoft and the defendants settled the dispute, agreeing in a 
Consent Preliminary Injunction that the two defendants would “disable 
malicious subdomains and [adopt] a process to verify the identities of 
sub-domain registrants.”152 The Kelihos litigation is instructive in 
several aspects. First, geographical location of a defendant outside the 
United States is not necessarily an impediment to an effective legal 
action when the domain registry (in this case VeriSign), or registrar,153 
is located in the United States and thus subject to the court’s 
jurisdiction. Due to the Internet infrastructure, a registry or registrar 
 
 148. Id.  
 149. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 6–7, 
Microsoft Corp. v. Piatti, No. 1:11-CV-1017 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 2011). A larger number of third 
parties were subject to the order, including VeriSign (Va.), ARIN (Va.), ATT Internet Services 
(Tx.), Charter Communications (Mo.), Internet.bs Corp. (Bahamas), and Moniker Online Services 
(Cal.). Id. at app. A. 
 150. Kelihos Complaint, supra note 146, at 22.  
 151. Id. at 5.  
 152. Consent Prelim. Inj., Microsoft Corp. v. Piatti, No. 1:11-CV-1017 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 
2011).   
 153. A registry operates the top-level domain addresses, such as .com in the case of 
VeriSign. See .com Registry Agreement, ICANN (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.icann.org/en/about 
/agreements/registries/com. A registrar sells domain names to individuals. For a description of 
registrar responsibilities, see Registrant Educational Materials, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en 
/resources/registrars/registrant-rights/educational (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). The Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), headquartered in the United States, is, 
in simple terms, the organization that coordinates the workings of Internet communication. See 
generally Welcome to ICANN!, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/welcome (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2015). 
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can take effective action to block the malicious domains or IP addresses 
from the Internet when ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Thus, even though not reaching an out-of-state defendant personally, a 
private action has the capability to reach the defendant’s Internet 
presence by means of a court order to an in-state registry or registrar. 
Second, Microsoft served notice to those who facilitate, or turn a blind 
eye, to botnet activity that they would not be insulated from liability. 
Assuming that the defendants in the Kelihos case did not directly 
participate in the illegal activity or botnet structure of the domain 
holders, they were nonetheless instrumental in facilitating the activity. 
The Kelihos action was a lesson to those who sell Internet domains that 
they have a duty to see the obvious, and that they must have procedures 
to prevent illegal and malicious actors from operating in their domains. 
C. Zeus 
The Financial Services-Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(FS-ISAC) and the National Automated Clearing House Association 
(NACHA) joined Microsoft as plaintiffs in a legal action in March 2012 
to takedown the Zeus botnet.154 The allegations stated that 13 million 
computers were involuntarily enlisted into the botnet, which was 
responsible for the theft of over $100 million in five years.155 Using a 
botnet structure, the defendants tricked individuals into interacting with 
a fake web interface that looked very similar to one that the plaintiffs 
would ordinarily use.156 During the interaction, malware would be 
surreptitiously and fraudulently installed that would steal the user’s 
account logins, especially designed to steal online banking 
information.157 The interface would also collect personal and financial 
information, and the installed malware would secretly and 
surreptitiously take money from customer bank accounts, even during 
 
 154. See Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335 (E.D.N.Y. March 
19, 2012) [hereinafter Zeus Complaint]. 
 155. Id. at 1.  
 156. Id. at 13. 
 157. Id. at 20–21, 24–25 (“The websites of nearly every major financial institution, 
Microsoft and a wide array of other Internet companies have been targeted by the Defendants and 
the Zeus Botnets in this way.”). The general name for this type of activity is phishing. See Internet 
Crime Schemes, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, http://www.ic3.gov/crime 
schemes.aspx#item-14 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). For further discussion about different methods 
of cyberattacks/weapons, see Gary D. Brown & Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than Done: 
Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 115, 120–27 (2014). 
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the customer’s own online transaction, and wire it to a botnet 
owner’s/agent’s account.158  
Zeus was a global, criminal operation controlled and coordinated 
by several individual creators159 who sold the software code in ‘builder 
kits’ to other criminals.160 This botnet as a service could be purchased 
for an amount between $700 and $15,000 depending on the 
sophistication of the software code.161 One security firm called Zeus 
the “God of DIY [do-it-yourself] botnets” because of its ease-of-use, 
wide availability, and simple functionality.162  
In addition to the previously established legal bases for a lawsuit 
against botnets, Microsoft alleged violations163 of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).164 The interstate 
and international nature of the Internet was an unmistakable feature of 
the defendant’s actions, and in furtherance of the criminal enterprise, 
the defendants not only stole financial access information and withdrew 
money from the victims’ bank accounts, they also hired a network of 
“money mules” in the United States to move and store the stolen money 
among fraudulent bank accounts.165   
The court granted an ex parte TRO and seizure order directing the 
US Marshall to seize evidence located in two US states; it also ordered 
redirection of botnet traffic to a Microsoft site, transfer of unregistered 
botnet names to Microsoft, disabling of IP addresses, and preservation 
of evidence.166 The order to third parties was directed to registries and 
others in the United States under the All Writs Act.167 ICANN, located 
 
 158. See Zeus Complaint, supra note 154, at 25. 
 159. Id. at 2–9. 
 160. Id. at 15.  
 161. Id. 
 162. See Doug Macdonald, Zeus: God of DIY Botnets, FORTIGUARD, 
http://www.fortiguard.com/legacy/analysis/zeusanalysis.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) 
(providing a technical description of how a botnet is designed and operates). 
 163. See Zeus Complaint, supra note 154, at 35–37. 
 164. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d) (2006). 
For an excellent discussion of RICO’s international reach, including the necessity to tackle 
cybercrime through the use of this statute, see Gideon Mark, RICO’s Extraterritoriality, 50 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 543, 583–85 (2013). 
 165. See Zeus Complaint, supra note 154, at 36. 
 166. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause 
Re Prelim. Inj., Microsoft, Corp. v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012) 
[hereinafter Zeus TRO]. 
 167. Id. at 10–11. 
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in the United States, was directed to forward the Order to identified 
foreign registries.168 The Preliminary Injunction more explicitly 
provided for international cooperation, stating; “This Court 
respectfully requests, but does not order, that foreign domain registries 
and registrars take reasonable steps to work with Plaintiffs to ensure 
that Defendants cannot use the Appendix A domains to control the 
botnet.”169 
The court added a provision in the order to compensate the 
registries and associated entities for their actions to block the traffic 
and preserve evidence, according to “prevailing rates for technical 
assistance.”170 In addition, the court instructed that the orders be carried 
out with the “least degree of interference with the normal operation” of 
the Internet intermediaries as possible.171 
It is noteworthy in the development of legal precedent that 
Microsoft cited previous courts’ actions in Waledac, Rustock, and 
Kelihos, in its proposition that; “The requested ex parte relief is not 
uncommon when disabling dangerous botnets.”172 In contrast to the 
proposition that legal actions to takedown botnets were becoming 
standard operating procedure, a significant controversy over 
Microsoft’s tactics erupted outside of the courtroom, in at least part of 
the security community.173 When Microsoft took control of the 
identified, compromised domain traffic, it affected some sites 
maintained by security researchers who were watching and learning 
from the Zeus operation, in the same way that Microsoft planned to do 
with its court approved “sinkholing” of the websites.174 A security firm 
in the Netherlands also claimed that Microsoft had used information 
shared on a private security listserv, without permission from its 
authors, and that its civil action had interfered with ongoing criminal 
 
 168. Id. at 11–12. 
 169. Order for Prelim. Inj. at 5, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012). 
 170. See Zeus TRO, supra note 166, at 14. 
 171. Id. at 9. The court also prohibited Microsoft from accessing the content of traffic that 
was redirected to their servers, except for domain name identification. Id. at 10. 
 172. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application of for [sic] an Emergency Temporary 
Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause for Prelim. Inj. at 2, Microsoft Corp. 
v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012). 
 173. See Michael Sandee, Critical Analysis of Microsoft Operation B71, FOX IT (Apr. 12, 
2012), http://blog.fox-it.com/2012/04/12/critical-analysis-of-microsoft-operation-b71/. 
 174. Id.  
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investigations.175 In response, Microsoft’s counsel explained the legal 
necessity of keeping the number of people involved to a minimum in 
order to obtain an ex parte order, and defended its “disruptive” strategy 
as a beneficial supplement to criminal proceedings that were difficult 
to pursue.176 The public debate about Microsoft’s legal strategy to 
takedown Zeus illustrated a rift in the international security community 
over the role and effectiveness of private civil actions.177  
D. Nitol 
In September 2012, Microsoft targeted the takedown of the Nitol 
botnet that utilized an Internet domain from China.178 Through its 
domain, 3322.org, the defendants hosted subdomains that comprised 
the Nitol botnet, a botnet that produced spam and fraudulent emails, 
and precipitated theft and other illegal activities; it was also capable of 
a large scale [distributed] denial-of-service attack.179 The software was 
extremely difficult to remove, and could log user keystrokes as well as 
turn on the computer’s camera to observe the user.180 Interestingly, 
Microsoft discovered the operation of the botnet by accident, when it 
was testing the extent of unlicensed software sold in new computers in 
China. After buying new computers for testing, it found that one of the 
computers was infected with malware, right out of the box; as soon as 
it was turned on it immediately connected to the Internet and 
automatically started sending communications to the botnet command 
and control for instructions.181 
The Nitol botnet was especially damaging to users because it 
spread by means of physical devices such as thumb drives, as well as 
through Internet connections.182 Furthermore, it ran in the background 
of computer processing, unknown to the user. Analysis of the 3322.org 
domain found that it hosted a variety of malware, and allowed criminals 
 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
 177. See infra Part VI.  
 178. See Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. Peng Yong, No. 1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 
10, 2012) [hereinafter Nitol Complaint]. 
 179. Id. at 12, 19. 
 180. Id. at 5. 
 181. Id. at 5–6. 
 182. Id. at 10.  
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to avoid detection by using the 3322.org as the central place to direct 
communications to other, changing, domain names.183   
The complaint contained allegations of violations of the CFAA, 
trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment, conversion, and negligence.184 
Microsoft alleged that “the massive scale of the problem shows that 
they [the defendants] are knowingly engaged in such [illegal botnet] 
activity and/or negligently failing to take reasonable steps to deter such 
activity.”185 The claim for negligence, similar to Kelihos, argued that 
the contractual registration agreements obligated the defendants to take 
reasonable care to avoid illegal actions, and that the breach of that duty 
was the cause of damages to Microsoft.186 The court granted the ex 
parte TRO and order that granted Microsoft control over the domain, 
establishing a server for the purpose of forwarding the illegal traffic (a 
sinkhole).187 
The dispute was resolved without further court action, and a 
release and settlement agreement entered into between Microsoft and 
the defendants.188 The defendants agreed “to work in cooperation with 
Microsoft and the National Computer Network Emergency Response 
Technical Team Coordination Center of China”189 (China CERT) to 
relaunch the domain, and to block the sub-domains identified as 
belonging to the botnet (provided by Microsoft or the China CERT) by 
redirecting them to a sinkhole maintained by MS or the China CERT 
and by adopting a “publicly-published policy of zero tolerance for 
illegal activities” on the domain.190 In consideration of those promises, 
Microsoft agreed to return the control of the domains to the parties.191 
 
 183. Id. at 16.  
 184. Id. at 1. 
 185. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Temporary 
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. Pen Yong, 
No. 1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2012). 
 186. See Nitol Complaint, supra note 178, at 23.  
 187. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. 
at 5–6, Microsoft Corp. v. Peng Yong, No. 1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2012). 
 188. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendants Peng Yong; Changzhou Bei Te Kang 
Mu Software Tech Co. Ltd; and John Does 1–3 at app. A, Microsoft Corp. v. Peng Yong, No. 
1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2012). 
 189. Id. at 1. 
 190. Id. at 2. 
 191. Non-Confidential Release and Settlement Agreement (Sept. 24, 2012) at 2–3 (on file 
with the author).  
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The Nitol botnet action was unique because of its genesis in the 
supply chain. As the case developed, international cooperation by 
Chinese authorities and Chinese CERT proved uniquely valuable for 
settling the case and essential for an effective resolution. While some 
security commentators questioned whether the settlement would be 
effective, as criminals would simply move to another dynamic domain 
name provider,192 the Nitol lawsuit aimed at a different level—
administration within the Internet infrastructure. While MS had control 
of the domain, it identified 70,000 malicious subdomains operating in 
connection with 500 strains of malicious software.193 MS operated a 
sinkhole for 16 days, during which “it blocked more than 609 million 
connections from more than 7,650,000 unique IP addresses.”194 Yet at 
the same time, the domain facilitated almost 35 million valid 
requests.195 Thus, the settlement is important not only as part of the 
fight against criminal activity, but also as a lesson about the 
responsibility of Internet intermediaries for overall security and safety.   
E. Bamital 
The primary purpose of the Bamital botnet was click fraud and 
browser hijacking.196 Bamital malware enrolled a computer in the 
botnet and ran without the user’s knowledge in the background, 
clicking on ads in order to earn money per click, and redirecting user 
search results to unintended websites and ads.197 The design of the 
malicious software in a modular fashion meant that the botnet could 
 
 192. See Paul Ducklin, Microsoft Settles Lawsuit Against 3322 dot org, NAKEDSECURITY 
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/10/05/microsoft-settles-lawsuit-against 
-3322-dot-org/. 
 193. See Kelly Jackson Higgins, Microsoft Hands Off Nitol Botnet Sinkhole Operation To 
Chinese CERT, INFORMATIONWEEK DARKREADING (Oct. 2, 2012, 1:41 PM), http:// 
www.darkreading.com/end-user/microsoft-hands-off-nitol-botnet-sinkhol/240008324. 
 194. Id. “A botnet sinkhole is a target machine used by researchers to gather information 
about a particular botnet. Sinkholing is the redirection of traffic from its original destination to 
one specified by the sinkhole owners. The altered destination is known as the sinkhole.” See 
Botnet Sinkhole, TECH TARGET (June 2014), http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/botnet 
-sinkhole. 
 195. See Higgins, supra note 193.  
 196. See Complaint at 15, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va. 
Jan. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Bamital Complaint]. 
 197. Id. at 16. 
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easily be used for other criminal and malicious purposes.198 The 
motivation for taking down this particular botnet related, in part, to the 
damage that click fraud presents to online advertising platforms, and 
the Microsoft Bing search and ad business in particular. Bamital was 
estimated to produce 3 million fraudulent clicks daily, costing 
Microsoft millions of dollars of damage in lost revenue, as well as 
incalculable damage to its reputation.199 
In October, 2013, MS200 followed its previously established 
framework for using the legal system to help takedown the Bamital 
botnet, seeking an ex parte proceeding, third party orders, seizures of 
physical evidence, and preliminary injunctions.201  
As each botnet takedown was successfully pursued through legal 
means, the cumulative nature of prior cases built stronger precedent for 
the requested relief.202 The Bamital Preliminary Injunction ordered a 
long list of registered domains in the botnet to be redirected to a server 
controlled by Microsoft, and another long list of unregistered domains 
to be directly transferred to Microsoft as the registrant.203 This allowed 
Microsoft to take control of Bamital and to thwart its continued spread.  
Third parties who were needed to assist in blocking the domains 
included registries, registrars and subdomain hosting entities. Not only 
were these third parties, such as VeriSign, located in the United States, 
but they also included the National Internet Exchange in India, the 
Public Interest Registry in charge of .org registrations, and 
administrators/hosts of domains in South Korea, Czech Republic, and 
 
 198. See Bamital Bites the Dust, SYMANTEC CONNECT BLOG (Feb. 6, 2013, 7:09 PM), 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bamital-bites-dust. For further information about the 
structure of Bamital, see PIOTR KRYSIUK & VIKRAM THAKUR, TROJAN.BAMITAL (2013). 
 199. See id. at 7. 
 200. Microsoft partnered with Symantec, whose security software update was affected by 
the botnet. See Richard Domingues Boscovich, Microsoft and Symantec Take Down Bamital 
Botnet That Hijacks Online Searches, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Feb. 6, 2013), http:// 
blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/02/06/microsoft-and-symantec-take-down-
bamital-botnet-that-hijacks-online-searches.aspx. 
 201. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corporation for an Emergency 
Temporary Restraining Order, Seizure Order, and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 3–4, 
Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2013).  
 202. Id. at 3–5. 
 203. Prelim. Inj. at 7–8, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va. 
Feb. 13, 2013). Surrender of computers and evidence held by hosting companies was also ordered. 
Id. at 9. 
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the Netherlands.204 Bamital owners, first named as John Does, were 
eventually identified as Marat Marynskij from either Lithuania or 
Belarus, and Dmitry Chupkhim of Russia.205  
Microsoft reported that by working with ICANN, registrars, and 
international organizations it was able to block over 7,000 domains 
from being registered for use in Bamital.206 MS acknowledged the 
cooperation of the Indian CERT in the cleanup efforts, as they 
facilitated the user notices so that cleanup tools could be made 
available.207 In an important additional extension of the strategy to 
remediate malicious botnets, Microsoft adopted a proactive cleanup 
program for user computers; for the first time it notified users directly, 
and provided tools for the user to uninstall the botnet software.208 
As the above descriptions of the botnet civil cases indicate, 
Microsoft did not act solely on its own. There was an evolution, 
however, in the most recent botnet actions, as coordinated, cooperative 
efforts with law enforcement were featured as a new method for 
tackling cybercrimes instigated by botnets. 
IV. COLLABORATIVE TAKEDOWNS 
The Citadel and ZeroAccess botnet actions were distinct from the 
first five actions led by Microsoft, not because of the legal arguments 
or basis for the civil lawsuit, but because of the extensive coordination 
in pursuing the botnet operators. Microsoft called its Citadel case in 
June 2013, its “most aggressive botnet operation to date,”209 as it 
included collaboration with the FBI, financial services entities, and the 
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The FBI 
 
 204. Complaint at 6–7, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (Jan. 31, 
2013).  
 205. Amended Complaint at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. Maznskij, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va. 
June 17, 2013). 
 206. Microsoft Corporation’s Status Report at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 
1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2013). 
 207. Richard Domingues Boscovich, Bamital Botnet Takedown is Successful; Cleanup 
Underway, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Feb. 22, 2013) http://blogs.technet.com/b/Microsoft 
_blog/archive/2013/02/22/bamital-botnet-takedown-is-successful-clean-up-underway.aspx. 
 208. Id.  
 209. See Richard Domingues Boscovich, Microsoft Works With Financial Services Industry 
Leaders, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (June 5, 2013), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog 
/archive/2013/06/05/microsoft-works-with-financial-services-industry-leaders-law-enforcement 
-and-others-to-disrupt-massive-financial-cybercrime-ring.aspx.  
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acted separately, but in coordination with, the civil action.210 In 
addition, the FBI provided communication with foreign law 
enforcement agencies in order to encourage voluntary worldwide 
action against the botnet.211 The FBI touted the collaborative nature of 
the pursuit of Citadel, stating that: 
Creating successful public-private relationships—in which tools, 
knowledge, and intelligence are shared—is the ultimate key to 
success in addressing cyber threats and is among the highest 
priorities of the FBI. We must ensure that, as cyber policy is 
developed, the ability of the private sector to coordinate in real time 
with the FBI is encouraged so that a multi-prong attack on our cyber 
adversaries can be as effective as possible.212 
In the second coordinated effort, undertaken at the end of 2013, 
the collaboration extended across the globe, including European 
country law enforcement, Europol, and industry partners, among 
others.213 These two cases arguably represent the current best practice 
of cyberdefense against botnets, the culmination of an evolution in 
legal strategy involving civil and criminal actions.  
A. Citadel 
In June 2013, Microsoft’s coordinated action tackled the Citadel 
family of botnets, dismantling over 1,400 unique botnets.214 As the FBI 
explained the timeline of events, “Microsoft exercised its independent 
civil authorities in this matter. The company then coordinated with the 
FBI and other private parties.”215 The Citadel botnet stole online 
banking passwords by employing techniques similar to the Zeus 
botnet.216 Also similarly, the creator of the software sold it 
prepackaged, in “builder kits” for an approximate price of $2,400.217 
 
 210. FBI Statement on Botnet Operation, FBI NEWS BLOG (June 5, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/botnets-101/fbi-statement-on-botnet-operation. 
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  
 213. See Richard Domingues Boscovich, Microsoft, Europol, FBI and Industry Partners 
Disrupt Notorious ZeroAccess Botnet That Hijacks Search Results, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG 
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/12/05/microsoft-europol 
-fbi-and-industry-partners-disrupt-notorious-zeroaccess-botnet-that-hijacks-search-results.aspx. 
 214. Id.  
 215. FBI Statement on Botnet Operation, supra note 210.  
 216. Complaint at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–82, No. 3:13-CV-319 (W.D.N.C. May 
29, 2013) [hereinafter Citadel Complaint]. 
 217. Id. at 8. 
08_ARTICLE_HILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2015  1:51 PM 
2015] CIVIL CYBER CONFLICT 199 
The perpetrators of the Citadel botnet were organized in a “single 
global criminal operation”218 that managed distribution chains, offered 
customer services, and sought continual improvement;219 functions 
eerily like those of management practices in mainstream organizations. 
Among other allegations, the RICO charges220 seemed particularly well 
suited to the facts. 
Two to five million computers were estimated to be infected with 
the Citadel malware, and the losses from the theft of money from bank 
accounts was called “staggering.”221 The “particularly sophisticated 
and destructive botnet enterprise”222 illustrated that botnet operators 
could evolve in reaction to defensive actions that sought to disable its 
reach. Bots checked for instructions every 20 minutes and the botnet 
controllers could update bots “almost instantaneously.”223 The users’ 
computers in a Citadel botnet were continuously monitored for online 
banking operations, and whenever the opportunity arose, the malware 
would steal passwords, account logins, and customer access 
information.224 In addition, the malware blocked automated security 
updates on the user’s computer, and prevented the user from manually 
accessing security websites; the result was an impossible situation for 
infected users who could not disentangle themselves from the claws of 
the botnet.225 
As in past botnet operations, except perhaps with more detailed 
instructions, Microsoft received an ex parte TRO that allowed it to, 
with orders to third party Internet entities for implementation, take 
control of currently registered harmful domains and operate them in 
place of the botnet controller, warehouse unregistered harmful 
domains, and seize servers and other evidence.226 Beyond these now 
well-established procedures, Microsoft took the proactive step of 
 
 218. Id. at 7.  
 219. See id. at 8–11. 
 220. See id. at 12–14. 
 221. Brief in Support of Microsoft’s Ex Parte Application for an Emergency Temporary 
Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 1, Microsoft Corp. 
v. John Does 1–82, No. 3:13-CV-319 (W.D.N.C. May 29, 2013).  
 222. Id. at 2. 
 223. See Citadel Complaint, supra note 216, at 22. 
 224. Id. at 7. 
 225. Id. at 22. 
 226. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. 
at 11–17, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–82, No. 3:13-CV-319 (W.D. N.C. May 29, 2013).  
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obtaining the right for a Microsoft server to send instructions to bots 
that would “stop the harmful acts of the Citadel botnet malicious 
software,” allow the computer to connect to security anti-virus 
websites, and direct the bot to a substituted the Microsoft server.227 
After two weeks, Microsoft could implement step two for those 
computers that continued to be infected with the Citadel malware; 
when an infected user accessed a browser, it was locked into a curative-
notice website for twenty minutes where the only thing that the user 
could do was stay on that site or go to an anti-virus website.228 In the 
case of an obstinate user, step three allowed Microsoft to run the 
curative website on the user’s computer for “up to one twenty minute 
period every five hours for one twenty-four period once per week, until 
such time as Microsoft deems it on longer necessary to prompt the 
owners of such infected end-user computers to take the steps necessary 
to cleanse them of the Citadel botnet infection.”229 The legal basis for 
the court order was that the actions were “consistent with the terms of 
Microsoft’s license to its Windows operating system.”230 
 The Citadel remediation action was reminiscent of the Coreflood 
botnet order that substituted a DoJ server for the command server and 
allowed the FBI to send a notice to infected users that would also 
uninstall the malware on an individual’s computers with express 
consent. The Microsoft remediation went further; it modified 
admittedly malicious code on a user’s computer without explicit 
consent and interfered for a short, yet increasingly intrusive, time with 
the user’s access to the Internet. The remediation efforts generally 
brought praise,231 however, like the Coreflood operation, it was not 
without its critics. A segment of the security community decried that 
Microsoft had included security domain names among the group of 
harmful names it sinkholed, and questioned Microsoft’s methodology 
 
 227. Id. at 20.  
 228. Id. at 20–21. 
 229. Id. at 21. 
 230. Id. at 19. The court order did not explain further; presumably the reference was to the 
authority under the license to install updates. 
 231. See, e.g., Paul Ducklin, FBI and Microsoft in Massive Takedown of Citadel Botnets, 
NAKEDSECURITY (June 6, 2013), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/06/06/fbi-and-microsoft 
-in-massive-takedown-of-citadel-crimeware/. 
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of inserting a “stop” command into the malware on a user’s 
computer.232 As explained: 
Microsoft ensures that once a bot connects to their sinkhole it stays 
there and won’t try to reach out to a different C&C. In theory, this 
is a very good idea and I have to say that many sinkhole operators 
had the same thought years ago. But unlike Microsoft, most of the 
sinkhole operators came to a different conclusion: Sending out valid 
configuration files de facto changes settings of a computer without 
the consent or knowledge of the user (computer owner). In most 
countries, this is violating local law.233 
The weak point in this criticism is that Microsoft did not act 
unilaterally as the security researcher implies; it obtained prior court 
approval. It respected the rule of law, was not taking part in unilateral 
offensive action, and followed established legal procedures. In sum:  
The act of writing up a complaint, backing it up with declarations in 
support of the plaintiff's motions, and having a federal judge review 
and grant plaintiff's motions is a very clear, very thorough, and very 
public justification for taking bold action. This process explains of 
[sic] who is being harmed, how they are being harmed, what can be 
done to stop the harm, and why the court should grant the plaintiff's 
motions.234 
B. ZeroAccess 
The ZeroAccess botnet engaged in click fraud, identity theft, and 
DoS attacks.235 Although click fraud might seem to be one of the least 
harmful actions that a botnet can take, it significantly damages business 
models for online advertising; criminals can steal millions of dollars a 
year in this manner.236 Online advertising amounted to $20.1 billion in 
the first half of 2013 alone, based in large part on payment for clicks 
on ads that were delivered, among others, by Microsoft’s Bing search 
 
 232. See Collateral Damage: Microsoft Hits Security Researchers Along With Citadel, 
SWISS SEC. BLOG (June 7, 2013), http://www.abuse.ch/?p=5362. 
 233. Id. No examples were given of what specific laws might be violated. For a study of the 
legal issues involved from a European Union viewpoint, see VIHUL ET AL., supra note 8, at 8–16. 
 234. David Dittrich, Thoughts on the Microsoft’s “Operation b71” (Zeus Botnet Civil Legal 
Action), HONEYNET PROJECT (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:56 AM), http://www.honeynet.org/node/830.  
 235. Complaint at 13, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–8, No. A13-CV-1014SS (W.D. Tex. 
Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter ZeroAccess Complaint].   
 236. Id. at 9. 
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engine.237 The ZeroAccess botnet hijacked browsers on infected 
computers to click on ads and fraudulently collect payment for the 
clicks while uninstalling and blocking security upgrades.238 In addition, 
ZeroAccess also interacted with Zeus purveyors from the former botnet 
so that it was surmised that the Zeus controllers were attempting to 
restart their botnet by piggybacking on ZeroAccess infections. 239 
ZeroAccess utilized eighteen servers located in Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany.240 Taking 
down this botnet in November 2013, therefore required global 
cooperation between public and private entities. While Microsoft was 
able to file suit in a civil action in Texas due to tens of thousands of 
compromised computers there,241 the international reach of the botnet 
required a coordinated effort with the FBI, Europol’s European 
Cybercrime Centre, and industry partners.242  
The ZeroAccess botnet architecture differed from some of the 
previous botnets, as it operated by means of a P2P system whereby each 
bot communicated directly with other bots in order to update the 
malware and pass on instructions.243 Each time a bot connected with 
another bot it asked for instructions and updates; in that way the viral 
communications reduced the necessity of continual communication 
with a central C&C server. Peers did contain a list of IP addresses that 
changed regularly, which provided further instructions to implement 
click fraud. In addition, a larger number of domain names were 
provided as backup locations for instructions should the IP addresses, 
located with static servers internationally, fail to respond.244 By not 
 
 237. Id. at 8–9. 
 238. Id. at 15–16. In addition, ZeroAccess ran silently on a user’s computer. Except perhaps 
for a slowdown in processing, the user would have no idea that the malware was running in the 
background while he was using the computer for other functions. Id. at 15.  
 239. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Ex Parte 
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 15, Microsoft Corp. v. 
John Does 1–8, No. A13-CV-1014SS (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter ZeroAccess Brief] 
(“In spite of these concerted efforts and successes [botnet civil actions] branches of the Zeus 
botnet live on, and the operators of Zeus are evidently using ZeroAccess-generated traffic to infect 
more computer in an attempt to rebuild their criminal enterprise.”). 
 240. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. 
at 4–5, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–8, No. A13-CV-1014SS (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013) 
[hereinafter ZeroAccess TRO].   
 241. Id. 
 242. Boscovich, supra note 213. 
 243. See ZeroAccess Complaint, supra note 235, at 12. 
 244. Id. at 14.  
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employing a C&C infrastructure alone, the ZeroAccess botnet was 
much more difficult to disarm; as Microsoft explained; “Due to its 
network architecture, ZeroAccess is one of the most robust and durable 
botnets on the Internet today.”245 A layered strategy was necessary for 
an effective takedown. The IP addresses were all maintained on servers 
outside the United States, therefore the court could only request, not 
order, that the hosting entities block access and cut off service.246 In 
this aspect of the fight against ZeroAccess, the global collaboration 
with law enforcement agencies and other private parties was key. 
Secondly, the court ordered domain registries in the United States to 
redirect active botnet traffic (sinkhole) to Microsoft substitute servers, 
and to transfer any inactive botnet domain name to Microsoft.247 The 
third part of the court order, and a new approach, directed forty-five 
ISPs in the United States to implement a block on traffic emanating 
from or directed to the botnet IP addresses.248 ISPs operate at different 
levels; they are both the “on-ramp,” or user-connection point, and they 
route Internet traffic from sender-to-destination.249 ISPs voluntarily 
undertake website blocking from time-to-time, for example when they 
implement blacklists of websites that are known to send spam.250 
When the botnet owners attempted to occupy and use substitute 
IP addresses and avoid a shutdown, Microsoft coordinated with its 
partners; “Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) took 
immediate action to coordinate with member country law enforcement 
agencies, led by Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt’s (BKA) Cyber 
Intelligence Unit, to quickly track down those new fraud IP 
addresses.”251 The botnet operators, evidently digitally surrendering, 
sent a final message to the infected computers simply stating “White 
Flag.”252 
 
 245. Id.  
 246. See ZeroAccess TRO, supra note 240, at 10. 
 247. Id. at 11–12. 
 248. Id. at 8–9. 
 249. See OLIVER HECKMANN, THE COMPETITIVE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER 13 (David 
Hutchison ed., 2006). 
 250. See About Spamhaus, SPAMHAUS PROJECT, http://www.spamhaus.org/organization/ 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (describing the organization, its blacklist of spam sites, and the use by 
ISPs). 
 251. Richard Domingues Boscovich, ZeroAccess Criminals Wave White Flag, OFFICIAL 
MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 19, 2013), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/12 
/19/zeroaccess-criminals-wave-white-flag-the-impact-of-partnerships-on-cybercrime.aspx.  
 252. Id. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Cybersecurity is a complex, dynamic, and thorny problem. As 
proven by the botnet takedown cases, private entities can proactively 
use the civil legal system to lead and contribute to cybersafety. One of 
the goals of this article is to document Microsoft’s legal strategy over 
the course of eight botnet takedowns so that it can be considered for 
future action by other private entities. Microsoft’s civil suits against 
botnets used legal tools in an innovative way to tackle an intractable 
and thorny global problem. The legal approach reduced botnet activity, 
provided a valuable service to users with infected computers, and more 
broadly increased the level of cybersecurity. Regardless, the wisdom 
of private civil action is not unanimously praised; as one security expert 
stated: “The problem with cybercrime is that it can’t be solved with 
doing takedowns. It’s only possible to solve this issue by implementing 
legislation related to cybercrime, enforce them [sic] by getting bad 
actors arrested and implementing security by design on different 
layers.”253 Some believe that Microsoft has stepped outside the bounds 
of its position as a private party,254 and that it is the role of legislatures 
and law enforcement to pursue criminals. In contrast, Microsoft 
proposes that civil lawsuits could be used by many private entities; the 
resulting increased cost of operating botnets would exert economic 
pressure on operators and thereby reduce the number of botnets due to 
those increased costs.255  
The private sector’s role in cybersecurity, and specifically the 
proactive legal role, deserves detailed analysis. The complex problems 
of public and private roles, jurisdictional boundaries, international 
cooperation, limited resources, and the technical sophistication of 
cyberattacks, will require further research. The outline of the 
Microsoft’s legal suits against botnets provides a springboard for 
further analysis. To begin this analysis, the following discussion 
suggests four lenses for future research into understanding the wider 
impact of the takedowns: crimtorts, governance theory, strategic 
 
 253. Zeljka Zorz, Microsoft Citadel Takedown Ultimately Counterproductive, HELP NET 
SECURITY (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.net-security.org/malware_news.php?id=2514 (result of 
takedowns is temporary). 
 254. See Collateral Damage, supra note 232; see also supra text accompanying note 233. 
The comments and reactions of security researchers to the interview with Richard Boscovich from 
Microsoft regarding the Zeus takedown were conflicting, and the topic of Microsoft, law 
enforcement, and the security industry roles was controversial. See Brian Krebs, Microsoft 
Responds to Critics Over Botnet Bruhaha, KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:49 PM), 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/04/microsoft-responds-to-critics-over-botnet-bruhaha/. 
 255. Id.  
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management, and international lenses. Each of these lenses provokes 
both unique questions and support for the sustainability of civil actions 
for cybersecurity.  
A. Crimtorts Lens 
Viewed broadly, the question regarding Microsoft’s botnet 
takedown actions is whether the use of criminal law by means of law 
enforcement should be the authoritative vehicle for stopping 
cybercrime, and concurrently, what role if any the private sector should 
play. Rustad was one of the first scholars to promote a place for private 
enforcement actions against cybercrime in 2001, arguing that criminal 
law is “an inadequate institution of social control against 
cybercrime”256 because of cybercrime’s global reach, the lack of law 
enforcement resources, and constraints imposed by protecting civil 
liberties in the electronic environment,257 reasons that persist today.258 
Rustad argues for a cast of private attorneys general, serving the public 
interest through private lawsuits that apply established tort law to new 
situations in cyberspace, punishing the wrongdoer by means of punitive 
damages rather than criminal penalties.259 Rustad and his co-author 
Koenig previously developed the theory of the use of tort law to 
accomplish wider social benefits under the term “crimtort.”260 More 
recently, crimtort actions were described as “[c]ivil actions that 
concurrently fulfill the private function of compensating injured 
 
 256. See Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 
11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 67 (2001).  
 257. See id. at 96–100.  
 258. See Gregory T. Nojeim, Cybersecurity: Ideas Whose Time Has Not Come—And 
Shouldn’t, 8 J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 408, 418–19 (2012) (arguing that government 
should work with the private sector rather than directly alter/impact Internet traffic). 
 259. See Rustad, supra note 256, at 104–06. One could argue that early cases against spam 
and trespass to chattels, and the ebay v. Bidders Edge case, would fall into the paradigm of a 
private attorney general; however, the public interest in those cases is not featured as it was in the 
botnet documents, and the effect of the actions was more localized and plaintiff-specific than the 
promotion of overall Internet and consumer safety as was the issue in the botnet cases. For a 
discussion of these earlier cases and tort law, see Guzman, supra note 97, at 534–38; see also 
Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 484 (“Tort law not only bridges 
a regulatory gap, but it also bridges the hiatus left by criminal law that lags well behind 
technological and social changes, such as Internet-related wrongdoing.” (citations omitted)). 
 260. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” As Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 315 (1998).  
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claimants while serving the broader public purpose of controlling 
socially harmful behavior. . . .”261  
Microsoft’s botnet enforcement actions are similar to the private 
attorney general role envisioned by Rustad. In order for it to gain the 
extraordinary ex parte action without notice, and a preliminary 
injunction, Microsoft relied on the positive public interest served by its 
actions, and in contrast, the irreparable harm that would be suffered 
should the request not be granted.262 The briefs and court filings are, in 
fact, replete with references to the specific harms that individuals incur 
as a result of the botnet operations, from stolen funds, decreased 
computer functionality, to disabled security and future vulnerability. 
Undoubtedly, Microsoft’s legal actions have benefitted the general 
public.  
Microsoft pursued cybercriminals in the private attorney model, 
however there are distinctions between the modern pursuit of botnets 
and the previously envisioned private attorney general function. The 
concept of a private attorney general anticipates a consumer or 
environmental champion role, resulting in lawsuits against powerful 
corporations or institutions,263 supplementing the effectiveness of but 
not supplanting government enforcement.264 Although Microsoft cases 
evolved to include more explicit prior coordination with law 
enforcement, the cases turn the concept of the role of the large 
corporation around. Rather than the target of a private action to coerce 
publically beneficial behavior, the large corporation, Microsoft, was 
the leader of lawsuits to protect the public and to promote cybersecurity 
and safety.  
Another difference between traditionally conceived tort remedies 
that promote the public good and the botnet cases is that Microsoft has 
evidently not been able to obtain damages from any of the defendants, 
most of who remain at large and many who remain unidentified. 
Therefore, cybercriminals will not be deterred by the imposition of 
either compensatory or punitive damages; a predicate to the theory of 
 
 261. Thomas H. Koenig, Crimtorts: A Cure for Hardening of the Categories, 17 WIDENER 
L.J.  733, 733 (2008). 
 262. See, e.g., ZeroAccess Brief, supra note 239, at 23, 31. 
 263. See generally Nicholas DiMascio, Credit Where Credit is Due: The Legal Treatment 
of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions, 56 DUKE L.J. 1587 (2007) (discussing impact of 
private nuisance suits brought against corporations). 
 264. See Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L. J. 419, 490–91 (2012) 
(discussing application of theory to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
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the effectiveness of the private attorney general. Microsoft’s strategy 
to create an economic disincentive to wrongdoers by means of botnet 
disruptions may substitute in part for damages, but these economic 
damages are indirect and more difficult effect to measure. The crimtort 
or private attorney general theory may fit in the case of private civil 
actions against cybercrime, however further examination of the effect 
on cybercriminals is necessary. In addition, Microsoft has an inherent 
motivation to pursue civil actions against botnet operators who damage 
their reputation and harm their business model. Finding private entities 
that have as high a stake in the game as Microsoft will be difficult,265 
and the expansion of the private attorney general approach will depend 
upon attracting private parties who have the incentive to act similarly. 
B. Governance Theory Lens 
Traditional regulatory, governance theory assumes a top down 
and centralized system of laws and governmental implementation of 
those rules of behavior for society,266 assumptions that are not reflected 
in Microsoft’s leadership of the botnet takedowns. Yet cybercrime in 
general, and botnet crimes in particular, belong to an ecosystem that is 
difficult to govern and police, both technically and legally. Traditional 
governance theory may be insufficient to address the new environment.  
Polycentric governance theory may provide a more appropriate 
lens through which to view cybersecurity actions.267 The theory 
 
 265. Facebook cooperated with the FBI to takedown a botnet that spread through its users, 
providing users with software to uninstall the malware. However, Facebook did not file a civil 
suit or otherwise lead the effort in the way that Microsoft did. See Facebook and the FBI Partner 
to Take Botnet Offline, FACEBOOK SECURITY (Dec. 12, 2012, 12:05 PM), https:// 
www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-security/facebook-and-the-fbi-partner-to-take-botnet-offline 
/10151134554125766. 
 266. See Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses Through 
Integrated Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 411 (2012). Scholars have distinguished 
between the traditional modes of government regulation and broader governance, as explained in 
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete 
Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 274 (2009). 
However, the terms are used more generally in this article.  
 267. Other governance theories include new governance and deliberative democracy; a 
detailed discussion of different governance theories across disciplines is beyond the scope of this 
article. For a good overview of the theories, see Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A 
Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008). Compare Orly 
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) (“The new governance model connotes a 
decentering of legal scholarship, challenging the traditional focus on formal regulation as the 
dominant locus of change.”), with Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought 
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assumes the devolution of complete state power and governance amid 
increased governance participation by non-state entities, a movement 
toward multiple sources of governance, and increased local power.268 
Some scholars cite global Internet governance as an example of this 
new type of governance.269 Shackelford uses the lens of polycentric 
governance to propose a framework for cybersecurity that is 
approached most successfully by a multi-layered, multi-player, 
coordinated response.270 The actions by Microsoft, its interactions with 
security firms and researchers, and its collaborations with law 
enforcement, deserve further study as they relate to polycentric 
governance and other governance theories. Microsoft may be able to 
play a role that focuses on the safety of the Internet without the need 
for more exacting criminal proof and criminal arrests. Attribution is a 
thorny problem271 for bringing criminal charges, and private rather than 
criminal actions could be more effective. As is explained: 
Attribution, however, may be more important for government and 
law enforcement than for private sector organizations. Law 
enforcement, through their investigations, may strive for attribution 
so that the actual perpetrator may be prosecuted. Industry 
organizations, however, may be less concerned and may focus more 
on damage control and prevention—regardless of the actor or his 
motivations.272 
In addition, private sector leadership to secure the Internet, 
especially when access to individual computers is required, can avoid 
the stigma and limitation of government access. The federal 
government’s Conficker remediation drew criticism even though the 
 
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 
(2004) (asserting a reply to Lobel, taking issue with the consolidation of scholarship).  
 268. See Burris, supra note 267, at 15–19. See also KRISTIN M. FINKLEA & CATHERINE A. 
THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42547, CYBERCRIME: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 12 (2012). 
 269. See Burris, supra note 267, at 23. Additionally, Froomkin proposes that Internet 
standard adoption procedures could meet the deliberative discourse theory of Habermas. See A. 
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003).  
 270. Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks Through 
Polycentric Governance, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 1273, 1352–60 (2013). 
 271. For a complete view of attribution from cybercrime to military action, see Duncan B. 
Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 391–406 (2011). For a discussion of 
the issue of attribution for cyberwarfare, see Collin S. Allan, Attribution Issues in Cyberspace, 13 
CHI. KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55 (2013). 
 272. FINKLEA & THEOHARY, supra note 268, at 11.  
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court ordered the FBI not to access any files on computers that were 
freed from the botnet. More recently, National Security Agency 
surveillance has likely heightened concerns for government access to 
personal commuters, even though the circumstances are quite different; 
privacy from government intrusion is now a hotly contended issue. 
Whether individuals would trust the government or private entities 
more to respect their privacy while securing computers from 
cyberthreats deserves further scrutiny.273 
More broadly, and related to the polycentric approach, the report 
of the Conficker virus workgroup showed that local and grassroots 
actions in the horizontal environment of cybersecurity inherently result 
in problems with trust, exacerbated by the extremely decentralized 
governance model.274 Perhaps Microsoft’s leadership was a 
prerequisite for an effective governance paradigm, although 
communications between those with security information will always 
be essential. Microsoft is evidently ready to assume this role, as in 2013 
it created the Digital Crimes Unit and the Cybercrime Center, staffed 
by technical and legal experts, dedicated to tackling cybercrime.275 
Likewise, changing approaches to the botnet takedowns from a solely 
privately led civil suit, to the Citadel and ZeroAccess collaborations 
with law enforcement around the world, provide evidence that the 
governance of cybersecurity and the pursuit of cybercriminals have 
evolved towards an increasingly networked governance framework. 
Furthermore, in February of 2014 Microsoft announced that it signed 
Memorandums of Agreement with the Organization of American 
States, Europol, and FIS (banking and payment systems) that “establish 
a framework for collaboration . . . intended to spur collaboration”276 to 
pursue cybercriminals.  
 
 273. In a recent survey, respondents did not trust large companies to protect their privacy in 
general; however, they trusted the NSA even less. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Snowden Leaks Erode 
Trust in Internet Companies, Government, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 4, 2014, 8:23 AM PT), http:// 
www.computerworld.com/s/article/9247441/Snowden_leaks_erode_trust_in_Internet_companie
s_government.  
 274. See infra II.B.  
 275. See Microsoft Unveils State-of-the-Art Cybercrime Center, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER 
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2013/nov13/11-14cybercrime 
centerpr.aspx. 
 276. See Microsoft Enters Into New Global Partnerships in Fight Against Cybercrime, 
MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (Feb. 12, 2014), http://news.microsoft.com/2014/02/12/microsoft 
-enters-into-new-global-partnerships-in-fight-against-cybercrime. 
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C. Strategic Management Lens 
A broad definition of the strategic management of a firm is that it 
is a process by which a strategic plan is adopted, implemented, and 
revised in order to maintain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace.277 In this process, a company will not only identify its 
strategic strengths but it will seek to minimize its risks, or 
weaknesses.278 Considering Microsoft’s actions from a strategic 
management viewpoint, it makes sense for it to participate in, and it 
could be strategically astute for it to assume leadership of, efforts to 
combat the botnet plague. Botnets harm Microsoft’s reputation by 
counterfeiting and mimicking its products, weakening its advertising 
business model through clickfraud, and creating a lack of trust in the 
safety of the Internet. Microsoft’s competiveness could be hurt as a 
result.  
Microsoft has never denied that its actions were not internally 
beneficial or proposed that there were no economic motives for its 
actions. With regards to its civil actions to dismantle botnets, a 
Microsoft lawyer, Richard Boscovich, explained, “We’re not a 
charitable corporation, obviously. But there are some times when it 
makes good business sense to actually do good in the community as 
well. It’s one for those intersections where business and being a good 
corporate citizen actually complements each other.”279 Thus, one could 
seek to understand Microsoft’s actions from a business, strategic 
management, perspective.  
Porter and Kramer’s work in “creating shared value”280 for 
business and society alike may prove relevant to the analysis. Shared 
value is conceptualized as distinct from corporate responsibility or 
philanthropy, as it “recognizes that societal needs, not just conventional 
economic needs, define markets.”281 A purely economic corporate 
perspective, on the other hand, leaves societal interests outside of the 
strategic box, as consumers are viewed only as a source of profit and 
“societal problems [as] . . . economic costs in the firm’s value chain.”282 
In comparison, the shared value approach promoted by Porter and 
 
 277. See Nedelle Grossman, The Duty to Think Strategically, 73 LA. L. REV. 449, 455–473 
(2013) (relating strategy to the management of risk as well).  
 278. Id. at 459–61. 
 279. See Krebs, supra note 254.  
 280. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Jan–Feb. 2011, at 62.  
 281. Id. at 65.  
 282. Id. at 68.  
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Kramer encourages firms to consider societal needs as an integral part 
of their corporate strategy and as a vehicle for growth. As a general 
example, the provision of cybersecurity products to consumers would 
benefit the firm by the sales of its products, but would benefit both the 
consumer and the firm by reducing the risks of online activities and 
contributing to safety in cyberspace. Furthermore, if the cybersecurity 
firm also engaged in education about cyber-secure practices, then both 
the firm and the consumer would share in the value of the cybersafety 
efforts; the firm may also benefit from a new market for cyberproducts 
as a result of the consumer awareness.  
The Boscovich quote parallels the principle of shared value in 
some respect; both Microsoft and society in general have a common 
interest in reducing cybercrime, particularly crime facilitated by 
botnets. Few companies explicitly adopt the shared value approach, 
however, and while the societal and business benefit is evident in the 
pursuit of cybersecurity, it is unclear if Microsoft has reconceived its 
relationship in this way. Understanding Microsoft’s actions, its 
relationship to corporate responsibility, shared value, and the relevance 
of its legal strategies for overall strategic management will require 
additional analysis as its botnet remediation continues to evolve.283  
D. International Lens 
International dimensions have been discussed in the concepts of 
polycentric governance and strategic management284 and in the way in 
which nations across the globe have cooperated with Microsoft to 
voluntarily dismantle botnet structures.285 The international questions 
deserve further analysis as relates to Microsoft’s legal strategy and the 
role of private entities in cybersecurity.  
The significant extent of cooperation by foreign courts and foreign 
law enforcement with Microsoft and US court requests correlates with 
the magnitude of the problem and the difficulty of resolution. While 
not impossible, it is difficult and time consuming for law enforcement 
to follow criminals across international boundaries. Criminals who 
 
 283. The use of law for strategic management purposes has been addressed by Constance E. 
Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378 (2008); 
Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2008); George J. Siedel 
& Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641 (2010).  
 284. See discussions infra Parts VI.B–C. 
 285. For example, China’s CERT cooperated in the Nitol case and the ZeroAccess case 
involved several countries’ law enforcement agencies. See discussion infra Parts IV.D., V.B. 
08_ARTICLE_HILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2015  1:51 PM 
212 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
prey on individual consumers in foreign countries are particularly 
unlikely to be arrested, or followed, across international jurisdictional 
boundaries.286 The resources and expertise are simply not available to 
the local entities who otherwise would be the ones most appropriately 
protecting the public.287 U.S. courts also recognize their jurisdictional 
limitations; the Microsoft injunctions and orders included deferential 
requests for foreign cooperation to stop the spread of harmful 
botnets.288 International criminal coordination between law 
enforcement could be viewed through a different lens, especially in the 
current environment of suspicion raised by National Security Agency 
surveillance.289  
Whether Microsoft can continue its aggressive actions against 
cybercrime could depend on the international evolution of Internet 
governance, a complex issue with many different sides.290 On March 
14, 2014, the United States indicated that it would transfer to ICANN 
the U.S. Commerce Department/National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration’s role in the functioning of the domain 
name system.291 Public debate intensified around the announcement, 
and future developments are uncertain.292 As the botnet cases show, 
Microsoft’s strategy depends in part on the location of ICANN in the 
United States as a California incorporated entity. U.S. courts can exert 
jurisdiction and order ICANN to take measures to block and transfer 
domain names and IP addresses that are used for criminal purposes. If 
the Internet infrastructure changes more broadly so that major 
 
 286. See Danny Yadron, Grappling With Cybercrime, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2014, at A3. 
 287. Id.  
 288. For example, see the discussion of the Nitol case infra Part IV.D. 
 289. See Tom Brewster, Has the NSA’s Mass Spying Made Life Easier for Digital 
Criminals?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2014, 7:37 AM EST), http://www.theguardian.com 
/technology/2014/mar/07/nsa-spying-harmed-digital-crime-fight.  
 290. For a concise historical background to some of the changes in governance, see Jonathan 
Weinberg, Governments, Privatization, and “Privatization”: ICANN and the GAC, 18 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189 (2011). 
 291. See Press Release, Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., NTIA Announces Intent to 
Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions (Mar. 14, 2014), available at http:// 
www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-nam 
e-functions; see also Loretta Chao et al., U.S. Hopes to Soothe Cyberspying Tensions as Web 
Summit Looms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2014, at B3 (reporting that international distrust based on 
NSA surveillance led to a U.S. proposal to transfer control of Internet addressing).  
 292. See, e.g., Denver Nicks, Republicans Don’t Want America to Give Up Control of Web 
Addresses, TIME (Apr. 10, 2014), http://time.com/58277/republicans-dont-want-america-to-give 
-up-control-of-web-addresses/.  
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structural entities, such as ICANN or VeriSign, are not located in the 
United States then Microsoft will effectively lose its legal strategy to 
dismantle botnets.293 The relationship between ICANN, the United 
States, and the international community will continue to evolve; the 
Microsoft botnet cases illustrate one reason why Internet governance 
and infrastructure decisions are important to the future of 
cybersecurity. 
CONCLUSION 
This article contributes to an understanding of the role of the 
private sector in cybersecurity by chronicling civil lawsuits brought by 
Microsoft to takedown botnets, and by comparing the evolution of 
these takedowns to two different efforts, by law enforcement and an 
informal security group. The botnet takedowns by Microsoft have been 
subject to both praise and criticism, and some charged that Microsoft 
has acted as a “vigilante.”294 Microsoft’s efforts have evolved, 
however, to be significantly integrated with law enforcement efforts, 
as the most recent Citadel and ZeroAccess lawsuits illustrate. Microsoft 
heralded its Citadel operation as a success, and as the emergence of a 
new framework, describing the action as “a real world example of how 
public-private cooperation can work effectively within the judicial 
system, and how 20th-century legal precedent and common law 
principles dating back hundreds of years can be effectively applied 
toward 21st-century cybersecurity issues.”295 The FBI also recognizes 
the heightened importance of public private partnerships and 
international coordination. 296  
“Going it alone,” as Microsoft did in the series of cases before the 
Citadel and ZeroAccess botnet takedowns, has its risks. In takedown 
efforts occurring after this article was in production, Microsoft 
obtained an ex parte order allowing it to take control of 22 domains of 
 
 293. See supra note 153 and accompanying text describing the relationship of registries and 
domain names, and how this relates to the takedown of botnets. 
 294. See Dittrich, supra note 234; John Leyden, Microsoft Botnet Smackdown ‘Caused 
Collateral Damage, Failed to Kill Target,’ THE REGISTER (June 13, 2013, 12:59 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/06/13/ms_citadel_takedown_analysis.  
 295. See Boscovich, supra note 209. 
 296. See Richard P. Quinn, Nat’l Sec. Assistant Special Agent In Charge, FBI, Statement 
Before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on CyberSecurity, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Security Technologies (Apr. 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbis-role-in-cyber-security. 
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No-IP, based on evidence that subdomains were involved in botnet 
activity. Microsoft was unable, however, to handle the traffic of 
innocent users, and reportedly blocked 5 million valid users.297 Days 
later, Microsoft and Vitalwerks, the parent of No-IP, announced that 
the domains had been restored and the dispute was settled.298 Criticism 
of Microsoft’s failure ensued, tempered by praise for the results of the 
takedown, and spurring debate about private entities’ proper role in 
addressing cybercrime.299 
In the ultra-connected, electronically dependent world, botnets 
threaten the security of countries, people, and industries, because they 
are the vehicle for criminals, and potentially nation states, to disrupt 
society, harm privacy, commit fraud and theft, and seed distrust of the 
marketplace and Internet communications. Because of their 
commodification, botnets are easy to launch, and proliferate easily. Yet 
botnet defensive technology continues to strengthen, making them 
difficult to defeat through only technical counter measures. The 
evolution of a combination of technical methods, international 
collaborations, and legal strategies to defeat botnets shows promise for 
success. The active leadership of the private sector, using the legal 
system, will certainly be a component of future cybersecurity 
frameworks; understanding the dynamics and coordination of these 
relationships, and the limits of the applicable laws, will deserve future 
examination. For the present, the addition of a civil legal strategy to 
disrupt botnets to the many technical efforts by public and private 
parties to do the same strengthens cybersecurity and is becoming a 
powerful tool to fight cybercrime globally. 
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